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CUTTING OFF THE EU TO SPITE ITS 
FACE?: HOW TO PROMULGATE THE UK’S 
CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW RULES 
TO ENSURE STABILITY POST-BREXIT 
Abstract: As the UK struggles to figure out what its relationship with the world 
will look like after leaving the EU, scholars attempt to predict how it will answer 
the many remaining questions. One of the questions that the UK will face is what 
to do with existing EU law and, in particular, Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I). 
This regulation sets out the choice of law rules for any contractual agreements 
that are disputed in the UK. The UK must grapple with how to distinguish the 
laws from the EU and reinforce parliamentary sovereignty while also keeping the 
laws consistent to avoid chaos in the courts. The UK’s choice will have wide-
ranging implications; for example, it is estimated that forty percent of global 
commercial arbitrations are decided under English law. Given its prominence, 
this paper primarily focuses on English law when examining Rome I’s consisten-
cy with common law, but acknowledges that the laws of Scotland and Northern 
Ireland will also have to be taken into consideration. The analyses of this Note 
centers on what changes the UK could implement to Articles 3 and 9—as case 
studies—to best achieve the goal of Brexit while also preserving stability. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union 
(EU), an action that has become commonly known as Brexit.1 On January 23, 
2020, the Queen granted royal assent to the European Union (Withdrawal 
                                                                                                                           
 * Thank you to Professor Frank Garcia, Boston College Law School, for inspiring this Note topic. 
 1 Angela Dewan, Brexit’s Done. The UK Has Left the European Union, CNN (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://us.cnn.com/europe/live-news/brexit-day-uk-leaves-eu-gbr-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/
8KW4-KSUH]; see Jon Henley, Brexit Weekly Briefing: UK Counts Down to 31 January Departure, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2020/jan/07/brexit-weekly-
briefing-uk-counts-down-to-31-january-departure [https://perma.cc/TW6Q-CCAC]; see also Bianca 
Britton & Rob Picheta, Theresa May and EU Agree Brexit Delay, CNN (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.
cnn.com/uk/live-news/brexit-summit-delay-gbr-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/37YW-PW9L] (re-
porting that the UK’s date to leave the EU was previously March 29, 2019, but was pushed back after 
lawmakers failed to ratify a Brexit deal); Thomas Colson, Jeremy Corbyn Says UK May Have to Ex-
tend Article 50 and Delay Brexit, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
jeremy-corbyn-says-uk-may-have-to-extend-article-50-delay-brexit-50-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/475U-
2HHF] (reporting that an extension of Article 50 may be needed because of the inability to reach a 
Brexit deal); Alex Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know About the UK Leaving the 
EU, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887 [https://perma.cc/
9RHN-TZ6D]; Brexit: UK and EU Agree Delay to 31 October, BBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2019), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-47889404 [https://perma.cc/F4HM-KJDA]. 
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Agreement) Act 2020 (2020 Withdrawal Agreement) officially making it law.2 
The 2020 Withdrawal Agreement helps to establish what the UK and EU’s 
new relationship will look like and allows for a transition period.3 The 2020 
Withdrawal Agreement supplements the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018 (2018 Withdrawal Act), which was already passed by Parliament and 
given royal assent.4 The passage of the 2018 Withdrawal Act means that the 
                                                                                                                           
 2 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, PARLIAMENT, https://services.parliament.
uk/bills/2019-20/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html [https://perma.cc/C9YZ-4J55] (transform-
ing the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill into the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020); see Brexit: 
MPs Back Boris Johnson’s Plan to Leave EU on 31 January, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2019), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-50870939 [https://perma.cc/25E5-7H8N] (reporting that on Decem-
ber 20, 2019, the House of Commons in Parliament approved the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill by 
a vote of 348 for and 234 against); Jim Lawless, Britain’s Brexit Bill Passes Final Hurdle in Parlia-
ment, ABC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/britains-brexit-bill-
passes-final-hurdle-parliament-68462467 [https://perma.cc/2D86-CR59] (reporting that the House of 
Lords passed the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill on January 22, 2020); see also Royal Assent, PAR-
LIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/passage-bill/lords/lrds-royal-assent/ [https://
perma.cc/N43A-WJTL] (detailing that the passage of a bill occurs only after the bill has gone through 
the House of Lords and the House of Commons and then receives royal assent, and that once royal 
assent is given “an announcement is made in both houses”). 
 3 BBC NEWS, MPs Back Boris Johnson’s Plan, supra note 2. The EU (Withdrawal Agreement) 
Bill allows for an approximately one-year transition period, until the end of 2020. Chris Morris, What 
Is the Withdrawal Agreement Bill?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-50125338 [https://perma.cc/53VS-RYTP]. The journey to a comprehensive withdrawal 
agreement was long and plagued with uncertainty, as the previous three withdrawal agreements bro-
kered between the EU and UK had been decisively struck down by Parliament. See Britain and Brexit 
in Chaos: UK Parliament Rejects May’s EU Deal Again, NASDAQ (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.
nasdaq.com/article/britain-and-brexit-in-chaos-uk-parliament-rejects-mays-eu-deal-again-20190312-
00928 [https://perma.cc/Q88H-2N5Q] (reporting that Parliament struck down the second deal by a 
vote of 391 (against) to 242 (for)); Collin Dwyer & Vanessa Romo, U.K. Parliament Rejects Theresa 
May’s Brexit Deal in Pivotal Vote, NPR (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/15/685100164/
future-of-theresa-mays-brexit-deal-and-brexit-itself-hinges-on-pivotal-vote [https://perma.cc/Q628-
EPRE] (stating that Parliament voted to strike down the first withdrawal deal by a 432 to 202 vote); 
Jim Lawless & Danica Kirka, U.K. Rejects Brexit Deal for 3rd Time, Leaving the Plan for Exiting the 
E.U. in Tatters, TIME (Mar. 29, 2019), http://time.com/5561242/brexit-deal-vote-no-may/ [https://
perma.cc/XC4S-TXXA] (voting against the third Brexit deal 344 to 286); see also Thomas Colson & 
Adam Bienkov, How Brexit Will Play Out if MP’s Reject Theresa May’s Deal, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 10, 
2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-happens-next-in-brexit-2019-1 [https://perma.cc/9MGG-
ESQ9] (stating that thus far Theresa May has been unable to convince Parliament to pass her Brexit 
deal and outlining some of the possible next steps including an Article 50 extension, a “no deal” exit, 
or even holding a second referendum); Serina Sandhu, What Is No-Deal Brexit? The Consequences of 
the UK Leaving the EU Without a Deal, INEWS (Mar. 16, 2019), https://inews.co.uk/news/brexit/no-
deal-brexit-what-meaning-uk-leave-uk-consequences/ [https://perma.cc/8M5W-ERXH] (warning that 
without a deal, “consumers, businesses, and public bodies would have to respond immediately to 
changes as result of leaving the EU” and that there would be a lot of uncertainty created, one of the 
earlier rejected drafts of the withdrawal agreement built in a twenty-one month transition period); 
Brexit: UK and EU Agree Delay, supra note 1 (stating that Brexit has been extended to October 31, 
2019). 
 4 See THE EUROPEAN UNION COMM., SCRUTINISING BREXIT: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, 2016-
1, HL 33, at 4 (UK) (holding that “Parliament will have to approve the ratification of the treaties that 
emerge from the negotiations and to enact the domestic legislation that is necessary to give them ef-
2020] UK's Contractual Choice of Law Rules Post-Brexit 1449 
European Communities Act of 1972 will be revoked when the UK leaves the 
EU5 and any remaining EU laws will be transformed into UK national laws.6 
Although on its face this seems to answer the question of what will happen to 
the EU law currently binding the UK, the 2018 Withdrawal Act grants Parlia-
ment the authority to modify the transformed EU laws as it sees fit.7 Therefore, 
a significant amount of uncertainty remains regarding which laws Parliament 
will retain in their current form and which they will modify.8 
Current EU law covers a broad range of industries, making the retention 
of EU law critical to ensuring that a “black hole” is not created that would 
plague the UK legal system with uncertainty.9 Such retention also gives Par-
                                                                                                                           
fect” in order to ensure that the treaties meet the goals of the Government and the public); European 
Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, PARLIAMENT, https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/european
unionwithdrawal.html [https://perma.cc/UY6Z-4SNN] [hereinafter EU Withdrawal Act Website] 
(showing that the bill received Royal Assent on June 28, 2018);  Royal Assent, supra note 2; The Eu-
ropean Union (Withdrawal) Bill and Its Implications for Wales: History, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR 
WALES, http://www.senedd.assembly.wales/mgIssueHistoryChronology.aspx?IId=15915 [https://
perma.cc/6XVX-AEFT] (indicating that the bill was originally called the “Great Repeal Bill” before 
later being changed to the “The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018”); Lawless et al., supra note 
3 (reporting that an agreement with the EU for the UK’s withdrawal has not been approved by Parlia-
ment yet). Royal assent is “when the Queen formally agrees to make the bill into an Act of Parliament 
(law).” Royal Assent, supra note 2. 
 5 Morris, supra note 3. The EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill alters the European Union (With-
drawal) Act 2018 by “reinstat[ing] [the European Communities Act] immediately until the end of 
2020 when the transition period ends.” Id. 
 6 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, §§ 1–3 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating the effect of the 
European Union (Withdrawal Act) is that EU law, with some adjustments, will operate as UK domes-
tic law after they leave the EU); European Communities Act 1972, PARLIAMENT, https://www.
parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-europe/
collections/parliament-and-europe/european-act-1972/ [https://perma.cc/MW4F-MXFD] (defining the 
European Communities Act as the legislation that legally made the United Kingdom a member of the 
European Economic Community); EU Withdrawal Act Website, supra note 4 (summarizing the Euro-
pean Union Withdrawal Act as “[a] Bill to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and make 
other provision[s] in connection with the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU”). 
 7 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating that “[r]etained 
direct principal EU legislation cannot be modified by any primary or subordinate legislation other than 
— (a) an Act of Parliament” or other specified type of legislation). The European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill did not substantively change section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
2018, which dealt with the “status of retained EU law.” European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 
2019-1, HC Bill [1] cl. 25–26 (UK). 
 8 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, Explanatory Notes ¶ 10 (UK) (“It will then 
be for Parliament and, where appropriate, the devolved legislatures to make any future changes.”). 
 9 See Departments and Executive Agencies, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/
departments_en [https://perma.cc/6N7Y-8XWG] (showing that the European Commission has fifty-three 
departments, which range in addressing topics such as Agriculture and Rural Development, Climate 
Action, Health and Food Safety, Mobility and Transport, and Trade); EU Withdrawal Act, INST. FOR 
GOV’T (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/eu-withdrawal-act [https://
perma.cc/7KHW-PUA6] (stating that the “Act is essentially a giant ‘copy and paste exercise’” and 
that the point of the bill was to get the laws on the books without having to go through and make 
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liament time to repeal and modify the laws as it pleases.10 Time to navigate 
this new legal landscape is crucial because companies across the globe com-
monly utilize English law in their transactions.11 In fact, English law is the 
most popular law in international contracts, and parties are three times more 
likely to use English law in their international contracts than French, U.S., or 
German law.12 
This Note examines the UK’s options regarding the choice of law rules 
contained in EU Regulation 593/2008, which contains the choice of law rules 
that govern contractual disputes.13 Of specific consequence to this issue is how 
these different options will affect both principles that have historically existed 
in the UK and rules that were first implemented through Regulation 593/2008 
(Rome I).14 The historical principles are illustrated through an examination of 
                                                                                                                           
changes to each law one by one because there would not be enough time and that the Government 
wanted to avoid “creating a ‘black hole’ in the UK statute book and leading to legal uncertainty and 
confusion”). 
 10 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, Explanatory Notes ¶ 10 (UK) (stating that 
the purpose of the act is to maintain the status quo and allow Parliament time to make changes). 
 11 See PROVIDING A CROSS-BORDER CIVIL JUDICIAL COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, HER MAJES-
TY’S GOV’T 4 (Aug. 22, 2017), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/639271/Providing_a_cross-border_civil_judicial_cooperation_framework.
pdf [https://perma.cc/A7E2-ZR52] (stating that English law is “the most popular contract law used for 
conducting international transactions”). 
 12 See id.; Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract 
Laws, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455, 458–59 (2014) (reporting that based on the results of a twelve-
thousand participant study conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce, English law is 
“around three times more attractive to international commercial actors than U.S., French, or German 
contract laws,” and despite a closer margin still more likely to be used than Swiss law). 
 13 See Practical Law Dispute Resolution, Rome I: An Outline of the Key Provisions, THOMSON 
REUTERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/7-501-0335 [https://perma.cc/A7mA-
KX4R] [hereinafter Rome I Website]. Due to the prominence of English law when evaluating the 
language of Rome I against common law, this Note utilizes English common law, but acknowledges 
that Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own courts and parliamentary systems and that in some 
cases their laws might be different than England’s. See Tom Bolam, Common Mistakes in Choice of 
Law and Jurisdiction Clauses, FLADGATE (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.fladgate.com/2015/09/
common-mistakes-in-choice-of-law-and-jurisdiction-clauses/ [https://perma.cc/BL85-J3MT]. 
 14 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, 
Oct. 10, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1 [hereinafter TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version] (explaining what a 
regulation is in the UK); Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of 
Contractual Choice of Law, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 511, 516 (2006) (citing that the principle of 
party autonomy traces back to Charles Dumoulin, a Frenchman from the sixteenth century); Rome I 
Website, supra note 13 (stating that Rome I is a regulation and that Article 9(2) holds that “any con-
tractual provision will not be applied to the extent that it overrides mandatory provisions,” and “[t]he 
ECJ has held that Article 9 should be interpreted strictly”); Practical Law Dispute Resolution, Rome 
Convention: An Outline of the Key Provisions, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.
thomsonreuters.com/Document/Ib55545dfe83211e398db8b09b4f043e0/View/FullText.html [https://
perma.cc/Y6TK-MWKR] [hereinafter Rome Convention Website] (reporting that the UK did not adopt 
Article 7(1), which states “that the mandatory rules of another country (that is, a country other than 
the forum) with which the situation has a close connection may also be given effect to”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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Article 3 of Rome I, which defines the principle of party autonomy, and the 
rules implemented through Rome I are illustrated through Article 9, regarding 
overriding mandatory provisions.15 
Part I of this Note examines the general structure and operation of EU 
law, focusing on the creation of Rome I and the steps the UK has taken to de-
fine its future relationship with EU law thus far.16 Part II looks at the history of 
the UK’s decision to leave the European Union and analyzes the principles 
guiding the UK’s negotiations with the EU.17 Part III evaluates what the UK’s 
options are in regards to its choice of law framework after Brexit in light of its 
stated goals of maintaining “legal certainty” while also reasserting “parliamen-
tary sovereignty.”18 
I. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EVOLUTION OF CHOICE  
OF LAW RULES IN THE UK 
This Part examines the EU legal system generally and how the UK’s cur-
rent choice of law rules evolved out of that EU system.19 Section A of this Part 
explores the structure and functioning of the European Union and its legal sys-
tem.20 Section B of this Part looks at the history of choice of law rules in the 
EU with particular focus on Articles 3 and 9 of Rome I.21 
A. The Establishment of the European Union and Sources of EU Law 
The foundation for the modern day European Union was established 
through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, enacted in 
1952, and the Treaties of Rome, enacted in 1958, the latter of which consists of 
the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty and the European Atomic 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (June 17, 2008) 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 10, 13 (showing that 
choice of law principles regarding party autonomy are contained in Article 3 and that the choice of 
law principles regarding overriding mandatory provisions are contained in Article 9). 
 16 See infra notes 22 ̶ 88 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 93 ̶ 134 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 136  ̶265 and accompanying text. “Providing legal certainty” and asserting 
“Parliamentary sovereignty” are both goals that Theresa May originally laid out for Brexit. DEP’T FOR 
EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM AND NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (UK). The UK sought to provide legal certainty by 
“preserv[ing] the rights and obligations that already exist in the UK under EU law and provide a se-
cure basis for future changes to [their] domestic law.” Id. at 9. Asserting parliamentary sovereignty 
was defined as assuring that UK “laws will be made in London, Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Belfast, and 
will be based on the specific interests and values of the UK.” Id. at 13. 
 19 See infra notes 22 ̶ 88 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 22 ̶ 47 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 48 ̶ 88 and accompanying text. 
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Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty.22 The ECSC was the first step toward 
harmonization.23 The ECSC’s purpose was to allow signatory countries to have 
access to coal and steel, but also to monitor the other countries’ use of steel and 
coal and stop countries from being able to secretively mobilize military units.24 
The EEC built off of, and expanded, the principle of harmonization established 
in the ECSC.25 The purpose of the EEC was to create a unified economic mar-
ket in the contracting countries.26 The UK joined the EEC in 1973, after multi-
ple attempts to join the EEC in the 1960s.27 After creating economic uniformi-
ty, the Member States went a step further by enacting the Single European Act 
(SEA) in 1987.28 The SEA increased the power of the European Parliament, 
including the power to weigh in on proposed laws.29 One of the challenges in 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter EEC Treaty] (establishing that the original signatories of the Treaty establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community (EEC) were Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands); Euratom Treaty, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/
en/in-the-past/the-parliament-and-the-treaties/euratom-treaty [https://perma.cc/E8H2-TCL6] (stating 
that Euratom concerns the safe use of nuclear energy); EU Treaties, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/
european-union/law/treaties_en [https://perma.cc/J5Q9-LN2T] (reporting that the ECSC treaty was 
enacted on April 18, 1951 and terminated on July 8, 2002 and that the Treaties of Rome, composed of 
the EEC and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were enacted on January 1, 1958). 
 23 See The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, European Coal and Steel Community, ENCY-
CLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Coal-and-Steel-Community 
[https://perma.cc/VDA8-HVL9] (indicating that the European Coal and Steel Community was intend-
ed to be the first step towards the “United States of Europe”). 
 24 See id. (stating that this treaty was motivated by the belief that “a new economic and political 
framework was needed to avoid future Franco-German conflicts”); Summaries of EU Legislation: 
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty, EUR-LEX, https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0022 [https://perma.cc/] (summarizing that 
the purpose of the ECSC is monitoring countries’ uses of coal to ensure compliance with agreed upon 
benchmarks and to allow for coal and steel to move freely between the signatory countries). 
 25 See EU Treaties, supra note 22 (describing the main changes in the Treaties of Rome as being 
an “extension of European integration to include general economic cooperation”). 
 26 See EEC Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 2, 3 (stating in Article 2 that the aim of the EEC was 
“establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member 
States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, . . . and closer relations between its Mem-
ber States” and in Article 3 that some of the actions that will be taken include removing “obstacles to 
the free movement of persons, services and capital” and “the establishment of a common customs 
tariff and a common commercial policy towards third countries”). 
 27 See The ECC and the Single European Act, PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/about
/living-heritage/evolutionofparliament/legislativescrutiny/parliament-and-europe/overview/britain-
and-eec-to-single-european-act/ [https://perma.cc/5TY7-DNKV] (stating that Charles De Gaulle ve-
toed the UK’s application to join the EU twice, once in 1961 and once in 1969). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Kathryn Good, Institutional Reform Under the Single European Act, 3 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
299, 311, 313 (1988) (stating that by allowing a “second reading” of a proposed piece of legislation, 
through Article 149 of the Single European Act, Parliament gained more power because Parliament 
could now wield some power over the Council by suggesting amendments or rejecting the legisla-
tion); Jules Lonbay, The Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 31, 59 (1988) (describ-
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establishing a common market was the variety of rules governing important 
concerns, such as health and safety.30 The EEC had provisions that allowed for 
changes to the national laws, but only if there was a unanimous vote by the 
Council of the European Union, a legislative body of the EU.31 The SEA, 
however, made it easier for Member States to pass legislation by implementing 
voting by a qualified majority.32 
The principles established in the foundational treaties were evolved and 
codified in two treaties which are the “constitution” of the modern European 
Union, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU).33 The European Commission, which is given 
legal authority under the TFEU and TEU, was created in 1965 as the EU’s 
law-making body and is comprised of a representative from each Member 
State.34 The European Commission is responsible for proposing the laws and 
then the Council of the EU and European Parliament jointly pass the laws.35 
                                                                                                                           
ing the changes to Articles 6, 7, and 8 as giving Parliament more power regarding the passing of legis-
lation, but explaining Parliament did not have the final say). 
 30 Lonbay, supra note 29, at 39. 
 31 See id. at 39 & n.65 (describing the challenges to a common market and stating that Article 100 
permitted some changes to Member States laws that “directly affect the establishment or functioning 
of the Common Market” and that Article 253 states, “[i]f action by the Community should prove nec-
essary to attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the 
Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unani-
mously on a proposal from the Commission”); Council of the European Union, EUR. UNION, https://
europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en [https://perma.cc/J9BS-MCYU] 
(explaining that the Council of the European Union now votes alongside Parliament to pass laws). 
 32 See Good, supra note 29, at 306–07 (reporting that the Single Act sought to fix the issues 
caused by the unanimous vote requirement, including “inefficiency and uncertainty,” which was ex-
emplified by the French withholding their votes for seven months because the Council could not reach 
a unanimous decision about an agriculture rule on June 30, 1965); The ECC and the Single European 
Act, supra note 27 (stating that the implementation of voting by a qualified majority “allowed over 
280 pieces of legislation to be passed”). 
 33 See Udo Bux, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Sources and Scope of European Union 
Law, EUR. PARLIAMENT (Feb. 2020), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/6/sources-
and-scope-of-european-union-law [https://perma.cc/R8FU-BJSE] (stating that the TEU and TFEU are 
principal sources of EU Law). 
 34 See Giorgio Mussa, Fact Sheets on the European Union: The European Commission, EUROPE-
AN PARLIAMENT (Oct. 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/25/the-european-
commission [https://perma.cc/W626=D952] (defining the European Commission as a body created on 
April 8, 1965, through the Treaty Establishing a Single Council and Single Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, that has the legal authority, through Article 17 of the TEU and Articles 234, 244–
250, and 290–291 of the TFEU, that promulgates EU law, and has powers which include creating and 
“submit[ting] to the Council and Parliament any legislative proposals (for regulations or directives) 
needed to implement the treaties”). 
 35 See Council of the European Union, supra note 31 (defining the role of the Council of the EU 
as passing EU laws in coordination with the European Parliament, and that the Council of EU does 
not have “fixed members” but rather “the Council meets in 10 different configurations, each corre-
sponding to the policy area being discussed”) (emphasis omitted); European Parliament, EUR. UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/european-parliament_en [https://perma.
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The TFEU defines the types of legislation that can be adopted by EU bodies.36 
In particular, Article 288 defines what types of EU legislation are binding and 
cannot be altered in anyway.37 For example, a regulation is a piece of legisla-
tion that once enacted is binding on all Member States, and Member States 
cannot opt out of any portion.38 Other types of binding legislation are “deci-
sions,” which are binding on all identified parties, and “directives,” which 
promulgate a goal that must be met, but leaves it up to the Member States to 
decide how to reach that goal.39 In comparison, “recommendations” and “opin-
ions” are not binding.40 
Another critical source of modern-day EU Law comes from cases decided 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).41 The CJEU is the 
highest authority on all questions of EU law, meaning that the court alone is 
able to resolve disputes between nations interpreting EU law differently or 
consider a question of conflicting national law.42 Article 267 of the TFEU, Ar-
ticle 234 of the TEC, and the “doctrine of supremacy” grant the CJEU a large 
amount of power over Member States.43 The combined effect of these provi-
                                                                                                                           
cc/Y7HF-FHZM] (discussing that the European Parliament is composed of Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) from each of the Member States and votes on legislation). 
 36 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288 (defining the “legal acts of the union”). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See id. (promulgating in Article 288 that “a regulation shall have general application,” and that 
“[i]t shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States”). 
 39 See id. (defining what a directive is in the UK). 
 40 See id. (establishing that “recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force” in Arti-
cle 288). 
 41 See Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUROPA (Nov. 25, 2019), https://europa.
eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en [https://perma.cc/PR6W-QWD3] 
[hereinafter CJEU] (defining the role of the CJEU as “interpret[ing] EU law to make sure it is applied 
in the same way in all EU countries, and settles legal disputes between national governments and EU 
institutions”) (emphasis omitted). 
 42 See id. (stating that the role of the CJEU is to ensure that national courts are not interpreting the 
law in contradictory or different ways, provide clarification about what the proper interpretation of a 
law is, hold national courts accountable if they refuse to interpret the law in accordance with the 
CJEU, strike down EU laws if they contradict EU treaties, enact sanctions, and force EU Member 
States to act in certain circumstances). 
 43 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 267 (“The Court of Justice of the European Union 
shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) 
the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union; 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal 
may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request 
the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court 
or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. If such a question is raised in a case 
pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union shall act with the minimum of delay.”); Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 234, Dec. 12, 
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 127 (showing that Article 234 of the TEC essentially repeats the language of 
Article 267 of the TFEU); Hakan Kolcak, The Sovereignty of the European Court of Justice and the 
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sions is that questions of EU law that are brought to the highest courts in 
Member States have to be transferred to the CJEU, and then the CJEU decides 
how to interpret the law. 44 The interpretation is then applicable in all Member 
States and trumps all national laws.45 Thus, the precedent established by the 
CJEU combined with regulations and other legislation enacted through the 
EU’s governing bodies establishes the framework for identical EU laws to be 
implemented throughout the Member States.46 One of the by-products of this 
harmonization was the EU’s choice of law rules.47 
B. History of Choice of Law Principles in the UK 
The European Union adopted the Rome Convention as the first compre-
hensive choice of law regime in order to create a uniform standard for handling 
contractual choice of law issues in the EU.48 Although enacted in 1991, the 
                                                                                                                           
EU’s Supranational Legal System, INQUIRIES J., Vol. 6, No. 4 (2014), http://www.inquiriesjournal.
com/articles/883/the-sovereignty-of-the-european-court-of-justice-and-the-eus-supranational-legal-
system [https://perma.cc/N9EY-5WEA] (citing that the jurisdictional power of ECJ comes from Arti-
cle 177 of the Treaty of Rome, “Article 150 of the Euratom Treaty, Article 234 [of the] TEC and . . . 
Article 267 [of the] TFEU” and explaining that the “doctrine of supremacy” has been interpreted by 
the ECJ in the cases of Simmenthal and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft to mean that EU law is 
“supreme to all forms of national law” and the ECJ in International Handelsgesellschaft extended the 
supremacy to include supremacy over national constitutions).  
 44 See MATTHEW J. HOMEWOOD, EU LAW CONCENTRATE: LAW REVISION AND STUDY GUIDE 
45 (5th ed. 2016) (summarizing that the purpose Article 267 of the TFEU—and Article 234 of the 
TEC—is to ensure that “EU law has the same meaning and effect in all the Member States” and that 
“a question of EU law . . .  raised before a national court of last resort . . . must refer it to the Court of 
Justice”); Kolcak, supra note 43 (referencing the cases of Simmenthal and Internationale Han-
delsgesellschaft as standing for the rule that EU law is “supreme to all forms of national law”). 
 45 See HOMEWOOD, supra note 44 (detailing the purpose of Article 267 of the TFEU and Article 
234 of the TEC); Kolcak, supra note 43 (same).  
 46 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288; The ECC and the Single European Act, supra 
note 27 (explaining that the SEA “pav[ed] the way for common EU laws based on the principle of 
mutual recognition among Member States”); Lonbay, supra note 29, at 40–41 & n.73 (describing the 
ECJ’s decision in Rewe v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 
649, as establishing that Member States generally have to accept other Member States’ technical re-
quirements but can put into place rules that provide obstacles to free trade only if it is considered 
reasonable to fulfill an important goal, such as “protect[ing] public health or the environment in the 
general interest”); see also ERIC DAVIES, EUROPEAN SOURCES ONLINE, INFORMATION GUIDE: 
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2013), http://aei.pitt.edu/74891/1/Court_of_Justice
.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEV3-LAKU] (noting that the CJEU used to be called the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) and is often still referred to as the ECJ, and that in Costa v. ENEL, the ECJ “ruled that 
Community law is supreme, taking precedence over national law”). 
 47 See H. Matthew Horlacher, Note, The Rome Convention and the German Paradigm: Forecast-
ing the Demise of the European Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 27 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173, 174 (1994) (noting that a council was created to look at if the existing choice 
of law principles could be created into one code). 
 48 Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy in Non-Contractual Obligations: Rome II and Its Impacts on 
Choice of Law, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 861 (2009); see Rome Convention Website, supra note 
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Rome Convention was the product of a project that had started back in 1967.49 
The Commission of the European Communities created the Brussels Working 
Group in 1967 for the purpose of investigating whether the existing choice of 
law principles could be unified into one cohesive code.50 Such a code would 
promote legal certainty and stability, protect EU citizens’ rights, and reduce 
forum shopping.51 Nevertheless, because the Rome Convention was formed as 
an international treaty, its provisions were not automatically incorporated into 
national law and the European Court of Justice did not have the authority to 
hear cases regarding the interpretation of its language.52 This resulted in Mem-
ber States having different adaptations and interpretations of the Rome Con-
vention.53 
Rome I was enacted as an EU regulation years after the Rome Convention 
and governs contracts executed on or after December 17, 2009.54 Because 
Rome I was formed as an EU Regulation, it immediately provided greater uni-
formity because any modifications to Rome I would automatically be incorpo-
rated into the laws of the Member States under Article 288 of the TFEU.55 Ad-
                                                                                                                           
14 (stating the Rome Convention took effect on April 1, 1991, and it applies to all contracts made 
between April 1991 and December 17, 2009). 
 49 Horlacher, supra note 47 (reporting that the Brussels Working Group, formed in 1967, was the 
first group tasked with investigating if the conflict of law rules could be harmonized). 
 50 See id. at 174 & n.5 (noting that the idea came out of a proposal submitted by “Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg,” also known as the Benelux countries). 
 51 Council Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 
O.J. (C 282) 1, 4–5 (quoting the speech of T. Vogelaar, the Director-General for the Internal Market 
and Approximation of Legislation at the Commission in February 1969 in which he stressed the ad-
vantages of having uniform choice of law rules). 
 52 See Dr. Volker Behr, Rome I Regulation a — Mostly — Unified Private International Law of 
Contractual Relationships Within — Most — of the European Union, 29 J.L. & COM. 233, 235–37 
(2011) (explaining that because the Rome Convention was a convention, different Member States had 
different versions of it based on when they entered the EU, because it had undergone different trans-
formations over time and the countries had the ability to enter reservations to the treaty, these two 
issues were eliminated with Rome I because it was promulgated as a regulation, therefore “the Regu-
lation does not allow reservations . . . [and] is automatically applicable in Member States”); Ralf 
Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 1618 (2008) (stating 
that because the Rome Convention was “a treaty . . . the European Court of Justice did not have gen-
eral competence”).  
 53 See Behr, supra note 52, at 235–37. 
 54 See Rome I Website, supra note 13 (indicating that Rome I is an abbreviation of Regulation 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations). 
 55 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288; Behr, supra note 52, at 237 (noting that Rome 
I, by being promulgated as a regulation, corrected the flaws of the Rome Convention because “the 
Regulation does not allow reservations . . . [and] is automatically applicable in Member States”); 
Practical Law Dispute Resolution, Rome I and Rome II: A Summary, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/3-216-8958 [https://perma.cc/2EVH-YP4G] [hereinafter 
Rome I and Rome II Website] (summarizing that both regulations were established in part “to harmo-
nise the rules that determine what law applies to contractual and non-contractual disputes, with the 
aim of ensuring that the courts in the European Union apply the same law to the same international 
dispute”).  
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ditionally, because Rome I was a piece of EU legislation the CJEU not only 
had the ultimate authority to resolve any questions of law that arose, but also 
could provide a “uniform interpretation” of Rome I since CJEU decisions trump 
all national courts’ interpretations.56 Thus, all twenty-nine articles of Rome I are 
currently codified and interpreted in the same way in the Member States.57 
1. The Principle of Party Autonomy 
The history of the principle of party autonomy traces back to the sixteenth 
century.58 The principle of party autonomy challenged the existing principle of 
lex loci contractus, meaning the law governing the contract was the “law of 
place where the contract was made,” and quickly overtook it.59 Over time, the 
principle of party autonomy has expanded in scope and complexity, but the 
core principle of respecting the parties’ intentions has remained the same.60 
The principle of Party Autonomy was an integral part of the Rome Con-
vention and is currently codified in Article 3 of Rome I.61 Although the provi-
sion basically stayed the same, Article 3 contained two important modifica-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (summarizing the purpose of Article 267 of the TFEU, 
Article 234 of the TEC, and referencing the cases Simmenthal and Internationale Hndelsgesellschaft); 
see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 
(ROME I): OUTLINE OF THE MAIN PROVISIONS 1, 3 (Feb. 2010), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.
gov.uk/20110201153849/http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/docs/guidance-law-contractual-
obligations-romei.pdf [http://perma.cc/X5UA-4WJB] (noting that the ECJ has the final say on all 
issues regarding the interpretation of Rome I); CJEU, supra note 41 (defining the ECJ as one of the 
courts of the CJEU, where the CJEU is the highest authority for interpreting EU law and is located in 
Luxembourg). 
 57 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288 (providing the definition of a regulation in Arti-
cle 288 and stating that a regulation is “binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States”); Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 6–16; CJEU, supra note 41. 
 58 See Zhang, supra note 14, at 516 (citing that the principle of party autonomy traces back to 
Charles Dumoulin in the sixteenth century, who stated that in contracts “the will of the parties is sov-
ereign”). 
 59 See id. at 517–19 (explaining how the principle of party autonomy quickly expanded in scope). 
 60 See id. at 517–19, 521 (explaining that the scope of party autonomy expanded not only to de-
termine “the validity of the contract” but also to “the determination of the rights and duties arising out 
of valid contracts” and the development of “the doctrine of dépeçage . . . that allows different aspects 
of a contract to be governed by different systems of law” and that there is currently a debate over if 
“the whole law of a designated state or country would include that state or the country’s conflict of 
law rules . . . [a] problem . . . commonly characterized as renvoi”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 61 See Rome I Website, supra note 13 (“Article 3(1) provides that a contract will be governed by 
the law chosen by the parties. Such choice must be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the 
terms of the contract or circumstances of the case.”); Rome Convention Website, supra note 14 (indi-
cating that the “primary rule” is contained in Article 3, which promulgates the rule of party autono-
my); see also Behr, supra note 52, at 241 (noting that Rome I, unlike some other choice of law rules, 
such as those of the United States, does not require the “chosen law to bear some ‘reasonable’ or ‘sub-
stantial’ relationship to the parties or the transaction”). 
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tions to the Rome Convention.62 First, it altered the standard for finding an 
inferred choice of law from “reasonable certainty,” based on the contents of the 
contract, to “clearly demonstrated.”63 The Rome Convention language was 
unclear as to whether or not the parties had to cement their choice of law in an 
express provision or if the choice could be implied based on the language in 
the contract.64 At the time of its adoption, the Ministry of Justice published a 
document to express its approval of the clarification.65 Second, Rome I made 
clear that the courts should take into consideration if the parties have given a 
court “exclusive jurisdiction” when evaluating if the parties have made a 
choice of law.66 This modification was deemed to track English law by the 
Ministry of Justice, and the positivity of these changes has not been questioned 
in the wake of Brexit.67 
2. Overriding Mandatory Provisions 
Overriding Mandatory Provisions are rules that parties cannot contract 
around in an international context and will prevail even if the parties have cho-
sen a law that would otherwise contradict those provisions.68 Refusing to en-
force a law based on an overriding mandatory provision is different from ex-
                                                                                                                           
 62 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3 (“[T]he Rome I Regulation contains two useful 
clarifications.”).  
 63 See id. (detailing that the ability to infer a choice of law was clarified in Rome I); see also 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 3, opened for signature June 19, 
1980, 1980 O.J. (C 27) 37 (“A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice 
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract or the cir-
cumstances of the case.”); Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 10 (“A contract shall be governed by the law 
chosen by the parties. The choice shall be made expressly or clearly demonstrated by the terms of the 
contract or the circumstances of the case.”) (changing the wording of the Rome Convention).  
 64 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3 (expressing that Rome I clarified that the courts 
can find an implied choice by the parties as to what law will govern based on the contractual terms, 
the ability to find an implied choice was ambiguous in the Rome Convention). 
 65 See id.; About Us, MINISTRY OF JUST., https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-
of-justice/about#priorities [https://perma.cc/BC74-5NTH] (defining the Ministry of Justice as a branch 
of the UK government that is responsible for the “courts, prisons, probation services, and attendance 
centres”). 
 66 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 6 (stating that if the parties agree that a particular country 
should be the forum where the dispute is decided, the choice of forum “should be one of the factors to 
be taken into account in determining whether a choice of law has been clearly demonstrated”); Behr, 
supra note 52, at 243 (addressing that if the parties make a choice of forum, the courts will almost 
always find that the parties have made a choice of law); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3. 
 67 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3 (noting that the document by the MOJ mistaken-
ly refers to recital 12 as recital 14). 
 68 See Behr, supra note 52, at 259 (noting that the importance of overriding mandatory provisions 
comes from the fact that, despite contracts typically involving only the interests of private actors, 
sometimes the interests of other countries are affected in contracts); Nathalie Voser, Current Devel-
opment: Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law Applicable in International Commercial 
Arbitration, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 319, 321 (1996) (defining mandatory rules as rules that parties are 
unable to contract around). 
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cluding it on the basis of public policy.69 Mandatory rules, unlike public policy, 
are found in explicit provisions, whereas matters of public policy can be found 
both in explicit provisions or crafted as moral standards.70 Additionally, over-
riding mandatory rules can cover a broader range of issues than public policy.71 
Article 9 of the Rome Regulation addresses the issue of overriding man-
datory provisions.72 Prior to Article 9’s enactment, many Member States, in-
cluding the UK, had entered a reservation to Article 7(1) of the Rome Conven-
tion, which previously had addressed the issue of overriding mandatory provi-
sions.73 The UK entered the reservation because they perceived Article 7(1) to 
have an unacceptable amount of uncertainty.74 
The English common law perspective on mandatory overriding provisions 
can largely be gleaned from two cases: Ralli Bros. v. Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar 
and Foster v. Driscoll.75 Under Ralli Bros., a contract that involves English law 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 15 (citing in Article 21, separately from mandatory overrid-
ing provisions, the rules regarding the public policy of the forum stating “[t]he application of a provi-
sion of law of any country specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum”); Voser, supra note 68, at 
322 (citing the differences between mandatory rules and public policy). 
 70 See Voser, supra note 68, at 322 (stating that mandatory rules are defined as “explicit rules 
which seek application in a dispute at stake” and if the facts involve the issues that the rules cover, 
then they will apply) (emphasis omitted). 
 71 See id. (distinguishing mandatory rules from a public policy limitation by looking at the scope 
of issues that they cover). 
 72 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 13 (“1. Overriding mandatory provisions are provisions the 
respect for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its 
political, social or economic organisation, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation 
falling within their scope, irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract under this Regu-
lation. 2. Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provi-
sions of the law of the forum. 3. Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory provisions of the 
law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, 
in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. In 
considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose 
and to the consequences of their application or non-application.”). 
 73 See Behr, supra note 52, at 259; Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 
1980 O.J. (C 27) at 38 (“[Article 7(1):] When applying under this Convention the law of a country, 
effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has 
a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those rules must be applied 
whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering whether to give effect to these mandatory 
rules, regard shall be had to their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or 
non-application.”). 
 74 See Ole Lando, Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws: A Review, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 394, 
408 (1998) (reporting that those in the UK tasked with drafting the Rome Convention thought Article 
7(1) was a “recipe for confusion . . . for uncertainty etc . . . . for expense . . . and for delay”) (internal 
citations omitted); Rome I Website, supra note 13 (noting that the UK did not adopt Article 7(1) of the 
Rome Convention because the UK believed it would have caused too much uncertainty). 
 75 Beijing Jianlong Heavy Indus. Grp. v. Golden Ocean Grp. Ltd., Golden Zheijiang Inc., Ship 
Fin. Int’l Ltd. and SFL Bulk Holding Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Comm) 1063 [18] – [19] (Eng.) (summariz-
ing the holdings in Ralli Bros. v. Compania Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 (Eng.) and Foster 
v. Driscoll [1929] 1 KB 470 (Eng.)); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6. 
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is unenforceable if the contract would violate the law in the country where the 
contract will be performed.76 Foster similarly held that a contract could be held 
to be unenforceable as a matter of public policy if such contract would be a 
“breach of a foreign law.”77 Under the Rome Convention and the UK’s reser-
vation of Article 7(1), it was unclear whether the decisions in Ralli Bros and 
Foster were still precedential in the UK or if they had been overridden.78 
Article 9 of Rome I eliminated the ambiguity in Article 7(1) and provided 
a clearer rule articulating when overriding mandatory provisions apply.79 First, 
because Rome I is an EU regulation, it does not allow for reservations and, 
therefore, was binding on all Member States.80 This eliminated the question as 
to whether English case law still applied.81 Second, it solidified that if the 
overriding mandatory provision is the “law of the forum,” then that law is al-
ways applied.82 This is consistent with the holding in Ralli Bros, in which Eng-
lish courts held an English contract to be performed in Spain unenforceable 
because the agreed upon price violated Spanish law.83 Lastly, it clarified what 
would happen if the overriding mandatory provision came from a third coun-
try.84 Rome I established that if the overriding mandatory provision comes 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See Lando, supra note 74, at 404–06 (summarizing the court’s dismissal of an action to recover 
the difference between the contract price of £50, which was established through an English contract 
for the shipping of jute to Barcelona, and £10, the price set by the Spanish government as the maxi-
mum price that could be charged for shipping jute). 
 77 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6. 
 78 See id. (stating that there was uncertainty about whether the Foster or Ralli Bros. decisions 
remained in force in the UK, “in light of the UK’s reservation in respect of Article 7(1) of the Rome 
Convention” and the Rome Convention’s public policy rule). 
 79 See id. (“Article 9(3) removes the current ambiguity as to whether the European Court of Jus-
tice would consider that the old English jurisprudence would continue to be applied under the Rome 
Convention in light of the UK’s reservation in respect of Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention.”); 
supra note 72 (quoting Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 13 Art. 9). 
 80 Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-
law/legal-acts_en [https://perma.cc/39LN-AEJA] (stating that a regulation is legislation that must be 
“applied in its entirety across the EU”). 
 81 See id.; see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6 (stating that Article 9(3) promul-
gates a clearer rule that eliminates the questions surrounding if the Foster and Ralli Bros. decisions 
still applied in the UK, given that the UK entered a reservation to Article 7(1) of the Rome Conven-
tion). 
 82 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 13 (“Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application 
of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum.”). 
 83 See Beijing Jianlong Heavy Indus. Grp., [2013] EWHC (Comm) 1063 at [18] – [19] (citing as 
precedent Ralli Bros.’ holding that “an English law contract will not be enforceable where perfor-
mance of that contract is forbidden by the law of the place where it must be performed (the lex loci 
solutionis)”). 
 84 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 13 (EC) (“Effect may be given to the overriding mandatory 
provisions of the law of the country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or 
have been performed, in so far as those overriding mandatory provisions render the performance of 
the contract unlawful. In considering whether to give effect to those provisions, regard shall be had to 
their nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-application.”); MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6–7 (summarizing that the Rome Convention provided an answer to the 
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from a third country, then courts are given discretion to enforce the overriding 
mandatory provision, if the provision affects the performance of the contract.85 
The question regarding what happens if the overriding mandatory provision is 
from a third country has never been explicitly addressed in English common 
law.86 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice stated that the provision in Rome I 
generally tracked English common law.87 Similar to the changes made to Arti-
cle 3, the Ministry of Justice deemed these changes to be positive and they do 
not appear to have been substantively questioned.88 
II. BREXIT AND THE UK’S FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU 
The UK has undergone a period of turbulence and three Prime Ministers 
in order to leave the EU.89 This Part looks at the winding path that the UK took 
in order to successfully leave the EU and what clues it has left for what its fu-
ture relationship with the EU will look like.90 Section A of this Part examines 
the UK’s decision to leave the EU and some of the official and unofficial goals 
for the UK’s future relationship with the EU.91 Section B of this Part looks at 
what guidance the UK has published regarding which choice of law rules will 
be used after the UK leaves the EU as well as the proposed changes to the lan-
guage of Rome I.92 
A. The United Kingdom’s Decision to Leave the European Union 
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted through a referendum to 
leave the European Union.93 The “Leave” camp won by a slight margin, 51.9% 
to 48.1%, and the countries making up the UK were divided over whether the 
                                                                                                                           
question of whether or not to give effect to overriding mandatory provisions when the law being ap-
plied to the contract is another country’s law, which had not been previously answered by UK law). 
 85 Behr, supra note 52, at 258. 
 86 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6 (detailing that the authority for mandatory over-
riding provisions in English common law is primarily embodied by the holdings in Ralli Bros., which 
holds that “a contract governed by English law, could be unenforceable in accordance with the Eng-
lish law relating to the frustration of contracts” and Foster, which allows courts not to enforce con-
tracts that would violate another country’s laws because “to do so would be against the comity of 
nations and therefore contrary to public policy”). 
 87 See id. (stating that the changes “generally reflect[] the English law position” and “constitute[] 
an improvement in terms of legal certainty”). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See infra notes 102–109 and accompanying text. 
 90 See infra notes 93–134 and accompanying text. 
 91 See infra notes 93–101 and accompanying text. 
 92 See infra notes 102–134 and accompanying text. 
 93 Hunt & Wheeler, supra note 1 (reporting that 71.8% of eligible voters voted in the referendum, 
totaling thirty million voters). 
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majority of their citizens wanted to leave the EU or remain.94 There are many 
explanations for why those in the UK voted to leave the EU.95 Some have at-
tributed the vote as being an expression of frustration and a desire for an old 
way of life.96 Others believe it to be fueled by economic considerations, such 
as financial instability in various EU Member States.97 Another view blames a 
rise of nationalism and a reaction against elitism and immigration.98 Not all 
sectors of the population found these issues equally compelling, however.99 
Seventy-five percent of voters between eighteen and twenty-four opted to stay 
in the EU, whereas sixty-one percent of those over the age of sixty-five voted 
to leave.100 Due to the multiple factors influencing the decision, and the sharp 
divide between generations, the UK is still struggling with how to move for-
ward three years after the vote took place.101 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id.; EU Referendum: Results, BBC NEWS, https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/
results [https://perma.cc/P659-FDEA]. England and Wales had a majority vote to leave, with the 
“leave” camp getting 53.4% of the votes and 52.5% of the votes respectively. EU Referendum: Re-
sults, supra. In contrast the “remain camp” had the majority in Northern Ireland and Scotland with the 
“remain” camp getting 55.8% and 62.0% of the votes, respectively. Id. 
 95 See Craig Calhoun, Populism, Nationalism and Brexit, in BREXIT: SOCIOLOGICAL RESPONSES 
57, 58–60 (William Outhwaite ed., 2017) (noting that some of the reasons why people wanted to leave 
the EU was wanting to return to an old way of life, separate themselves from economically struggling 
countries in the EU, stop immigration into the UK, and reassert “English nationalism”). 
 96 See id. at 58 (suggesting that the majority of people voted for Brexit as an emotional act rather 
than “a strategic effort to secure a particular political or economic outcome”). 
 97 See John Mauldin & George Friedman, 3 Reasons Brits Voted for Brexit, FORBES (July 5, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2016/07/05/3-reasons-brits-voted-for-brexit/#7ff0ee251f9d 
[https://perma.cc/TE3M-9SYB] (“Opponents of the EU argued that it is a dysfunctional economic 
entity.”). 
 98 See Calhoun, supra note 95 at 58–59 (stating that those who voted for Brexit were “furious” at 
the effects they felt were caused by the decisions of powerful people within the UK, including diffi-
culties in getting their kids into school or seeing a doctor); see also Mauldin & Friedman, supra note 
97 (arguing that the fact that many believe that institutions such as “the EU, the IMF, and NATO” are 
no longer necessary demonstrates that there is a “rise of nationalism across the world”). 
 99 See Arnau Busquets Guàrdia, How Brexit Vote Broke Down, POLITICO: EUR. EDITION (June 24, 
2016), https://www.politico.eu/article/graphics-how-the-uk-voted-eu-referendum-brexit-demographics-
age-education-party-london-final-results/ (showing that 75% of those 18–24 voted to stay, 56% of 
those ages 25–49 voted to stay, 44% of those 50–64 voted to stay, and 39% of those 65+ voted to 
stay). 
 100 See id. 
 101 See Calhoun, supra note 95, at 58–60 (explaining that there are a variety of factors that may have 
motivated UK citizens to want to leave the EU); Peter Barnes, Brexit: What Happens Now?, BBC NEWS 
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46393399 [https://perma.cc/Y87B-76WF] (re-
porting that the UK left on January 31, 2020, but that it remains to be seen if a trade deal will be rati-
fied); Britton & Picheta, supra note 1 (reporting that the UK will not leave on March 29, 2019, due to 
the failure to ratify a deal); Guàrdia, supra note 99 (reporting how the different generations voted); 
Gaby Hinsliff, Brexit Relies on the Will of the People. What if We Don’t Know What That Is?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/06/brexit-will-of-
the-people-channel-4-poll-remain [https://perma.cc/7N2E-CTA6] (“[Members of Parliament’s (MPs)] 
constituents are increasingly exasperated with [MPs’] failure to resist and rebel . . . . It’s impossible to 
know for sure whether the public mood has shifted, let alone whether it’s shifted decisively enough to 
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B. The UK’s Vision for Its Relationship with the EU  
and EU Law Post-Brexit 
1. The UK’s Stated Goals of Brexit 
On the morning of June 24, 2016, a dumbstruck United Kingdom won-
dered what leaving the European Union really meant and who would define 
the path forward.102 At 8:25 that morning, David Cameron, the UK’s prime 
minister, announced that he intended to resign.103 Cameron had made it clear 
that he believed the UK should remain in the EU and therefore felt that the 
“UK needed fresh leadership” as it worked toward leaving the EU.104 Cameron 
announced that the new leader should be the one to initiate the Article 50 pro-
cess under the TEU, which allows a Member State to leave the EU, and work 
to create the new framework for the UK.105 
Theresa May stepped in to provide that “fresh leadership” and became 
prime minister on July 13, 2016, less than a month after the referendum.106 The 
chaos of Brexit, however, claimed another prime minister when May an-
                                                                                                                           
justify a second referendum.”); Brexit: UK and EU Agree Delay, supra note 1 (reporting that the date 
to leave the European Union has been extended to October 31, 2019). 
 102 See Sara Hobolt, The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent, 23 J. EUR. PUB. 
POL’Y, 1259, 1259 (2016); Ben Moshinsky, David Cameron Resigns, BUS. INSIDER (June 24, 2016), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/cameron-to-resign-2016-6 [https://perma.cc/52XU-4S8T]. 
 103 Moshinsky, supra note 102; Former British PM David Cameron Resigns from Parliament, 9 
NEWS (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.9news.com.au/world/former-british-pm-cameron-resigns-from-
parliament/30ed51a8-588d-4c34-9522-1fc80d30cdea [https://perma.cc/SX5R-FQD5]. A couple of 
months later David Cameron also “resigned his seat in the House of Commons” on September 13, 
2016, stating he did not want to be a “diversion.” Id. 
 104 See BBC News, Brexit: David Cameron Resigns as UK Votes to Leave, YOUTUBE (June 24, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=2&v=fXNV3Ad0qQ0 [https://perma.cc/8DH5-
RAXE] (announcing in his resignation speech, “I was absolutely clear about my belief that Britain is 
stronger, safer, and better off inside the European Union . . . but the British people have made a very 
clear decision to take a different path, and as such I think the country requires fresh leadership to take 
it in this direction”). 
 105 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ARTICLE 50 TEU: WITHDRAWAL OF A MEMBER STATE FROM 
THE EU 1–2 (Feb. 2016), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/577971/EPRS_
BRI(2016)577971_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF8C-F9JD] (summarizing the procedure for leaving the 
European Union, laid out in Section 2 of the TEU, which reads, “[a] Member State which decides to 
withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention,” and “the Union shall negotiate and con-
clude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal”); BBC NEWS, 
supra note 104 (announcing that the new leader should be the one to trigger Article 50). 
 106 See Cassie Werber, Explained: Why the UK Doesn’t Need an Election to Get a New Prime 
Minister, QUARTZ (July 12, 2016), https://qz.com/728849/explained-why-the-uk-doesnt-need-an-
election-to-get-a-new-prime-minister/ [https://perma.cc/4JMX-7GJ6] (explaining that Theresa May, a 
member of the Conservative Party, did not have to be elected because “it was the party that was elect-
ed” not the former Prime Minster, and since all other candidates had stepped aside, May merely need-
ed permission from the Queen). 
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nounced her resignation on June 7, 2019.107 On July 24, 2019, Boris Johnson 
became Britain’s prime minister with the goal of ensuring that Brexit oc-
cured.108 
When May took over, the leaders of the Leave campaign did not appear to 
have thought through what leaving the EU would entail.109 Despite this, May 
took the first step forward and informed the European Council that the UK 
wanted to leave the EU, as required under Article 50 of the TEU.110 In that let-
ter, May addressed the importance of maintaining certainty as the UK negoti-
ated to leave the EU.111 
May laid out her twelve goals for the negotiating a new relationship with 
the EU in a speech on January 17, 2017 and memorialized and expanded on 
those twelve goals in a White Paper that was presented to Parliament.112 May 
again emphasized that the UK wanted to “provid[e] legal certainty” throughout 
this process and introduced the “Great Repeal Bill,” later renamed the Europe-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Stephen Castle et al., Theresa May to Resign as U.K. Prime Minister, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/world/europe/theresa-may-resignation.html [https://perma.
cc/4ZBP-E5V4]. 
 108 Yaron Steinbuch, Boris Johnson Takes Over for Theresa May as Britain’s PM, N.Y. POST 
(July 24, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/07/24/boris-johnson-takes-over-for-theresa-may-as-britains-
pm/ [https://perma.cc/VY8Z-8974] (“[Boris Johnson] promised in a victory speech Tuesday to deliver 
Brexit ‘in a new spirit of can-do.’”). 
 109 See Charlie Cooper, Brexit Campaigners Admit There Is No Plan for What Comes Next as 
Rivals Plan Tory Leadership Bids, INDEPENDENT (June 26, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/uk/politics/brexit-eu-referendum-campaigners-there-is-no-plan-next-pm-tory-leadership-contest-
a7104711.html [https://perma.cc/85N3-3UYZ] (reporting that one senior Conservative MP admitted 
“there is no plan, the leave campaign have no post-Brexit plan” and that the prime minister should be 
the one with the plan on how to move forward). 
 110 See EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 105, at 3 (stating there are no “substantive condi-
tions for a Member State to be able to exercise its right to withdrawal, but only procedural require-
ments,” nor does it “oblige the withdrawing Member State to state formally a reason for its decision”); 
Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister, to Donald Tusk, President of the European Council (Mar. 
29, 2017), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_17_article50.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6UUP-PAVW]. 
 111 Letter from Theresa May, supra note 110 (identifying some initial goals for the negotiation 
with the EU including: (1) operating with the “spirit of sincere cooperation,” (2) putting the interests 
of the citizens of the UK and EU before all else, (3) securing a “comprehensive agreement,” (4) creat-
ing an agreement that promotes certainty and “minimise[s] unnecessary disruption,” (5) “prioritis[ing] 
the biggest challenges,” and (6) “advanc[ing] and protect[ing] [their] shared European values” and 
combating threats). 
 112 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM AND 
NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017, Cm. 9417, at 5–6 (UK) (announcing that the 
12 principles are: “1. Providing certainty and clarity; 2. Taking control of our own laws; 3. Strength-
ening the Union; 4. Protecting our strong historic ties with Ireland and maintaining the Common 
Travel Area; 5. Controlling immigration; 6. Securing rights for EU nationals in the UK and UK na-
tionals in the EU; 7. Protecting workers’ rights; 8. Ensuring free trade with European markets; 9. Se-
curing new free trade agreements with other countries; 10. Ensuring the United Kingdom remains the 
best place for science and innovation; 11. Cooperating in the fight against crime and terrorism; and 12. 
Delivering a smooth, orderly exit from the EU”).  
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an Union (Withdrawal Act), in an effort to transform EU law into UK domestic 
law.113 This approach was meant to ensure that the laws in the UK would re-
main the same immediately after exiting the EU and to give Parliament time to 
change or repeal laws ad hoc.114 The 2020 Withdrawal Agreement modifies the 
European Union (Withdrawal Act), but it does not disturb Parliament’s ability 
to make changes to retained EU law.115 
Both May and Johnson’s governments made clear that a critical Brexit 
goal is to take control of the UK’s laws and reinforce parliamentary sovereign-
ty.116 In terms of dispute resolution mechanisms, the UK initially decided to 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. at 3–5, 9; see European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, §§ 1–3 (UK), http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (hold-
ing on June 26 2018 that the European Communities Act of 1972 will be “repealed on exit day” and 
that “[d]irect EU legislation, so far as operative immediately before exit day, forms part of domestic 
law on and after exit day”); European Communities Act 1972, INST. FOR GOV’T, https://www.institute
forgovernment.org.uk/explainers/1972-european-communities-act [https://perma.cc/AG48-ER7R] 
(noting that the UK incorporated into the EU with the passage of the 1972 European Communities Act 
and the effect of that incorporation was that EU law trumps UK law); The European Union (With-
drawal) Bill and Its Implications for Wales: History, supra note 4 (indicating that the bill was origi-
nally called the “Great Repeal Bill” before later being changed to the “The European Union (With-
drawal) Act 2018”). 
 114 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9 (stating the intention of the 
Great Repeal Bill is to “preserve the rights and obligations that already exist in the UK under EU law 
and provide a secure basis for future changes to our domestic law” while also giving Parliament the 
ability to “decide which elements of that law to keep, amend or repeal” after they have left the EU). 
 115 Section 7 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 details the “[s]tatus of retained EU 
law.” See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U]. A complete list of the 
changes to section 7 by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill are as follows: “Section 7 
(status of retained EU law) is amended as follows. (2) In subsection (1)(b) for “section 2” substitute 
“section 1A(2) or 1B(2).” (3) After subsection (1) insert—“(1A) Anything which—(a) was, immedi-
ately before IP completion day, primary legislation of a particular kind, subordinate legislation of a 
particular kind or another enactment of a particular kind, and (b) continues to be domestic law on and 
after IP completion day by virtue of section 2, continues to be domestic law as an enactment of the 
same kind.” (4) In subsection (5)—(a) in paragraph (a) after “(3)” insert “and (7)”, and (b) after para-
graph (b) insert—“(ba) section 7C (status of case law of European Court etc. in relation to retained EU 
law which is relevant separation agreement law),” (5) In subsection (6) for “exit day,” wherever it 
appears, substitute “IP completion day.” European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC 
Bill [1] schedule 5, European Union (Withdrawal) Act, supra, at 49 (UK); see also European Union 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1], Explanatory Notes ¶ 18 (“The Bill is designed to 
work in conjunction with the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 . . . [s]pecifically, the Bill will amend the EU 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 in order to give effect to the implementation period following the repeal of the 
European Communities Act 1972 (ECA).”). The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 
became law on January 23, 2020. European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, PARLIAMENT, 
https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2019-20/europeanunionwithdrawalagreement.html [https://perma.
cc/C9YZ-4J55]. 
 116 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13–14 (emphasizing that the 
UK should be the ones promulgating their laws and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the Eu-
ropean Union, a national court that enforces EU law, should be ended in the UK, and stating 1,056 
EU-related propositions were introduced into Parliament in 2016 as evidence that Parliament’s sover-
eignty was being undermined); NO DEAL READINESS REPORT, 2019, Cp. 179, at 3–4 (UK) (contain-
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terminate the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and expressed a desire to explore alternative forms of dispute resolu-
tion with the Member States.117 When pondering what the new dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms would look like, the policy paper distributed by the UK gov-
ernment in February 2017 stated that it should not be bound to precedent, but 
must ensure that the arrangements provide certainty and reflect the UK’s sov-
ereignty.118 Later, the UK backtracked slightly on its outright rejection of the 
CJEU.119 For example, rather than declaring that no UK court would be 
“bound to any retained case law,” the European Union (Withdrawal Agree-
ment) Bill put into place the ability to enact regulations describing when courts 
are bound to prior CJEU precedent.120 
The plan to deliver a smooth exit included creating an agreement before 
the exit date and allowing for a period of transition.121 Although both prime 
ministers have appeared willing to embrace some uncertainty to ensure Brexit 
occurs, both recognized the need for certainty as the country moves forward.122 
                                                                                                                           
ing a statement from Boris Johnson emphasizing that “there are many rules and procedures described 
in the following pages that have been laid down by the EU, but which—without Brexit—the UK on 
its own would have no power to vary in any way,” and “after 45 years in which the pace and range of 
this rule-making has increased far beyond what was expected (or advertised) in 1973, it is time to 
come out”); Alex Morales & Ian Wishart, Boris Johnson, Ursula Von Der Leyen Set Out Rival Red 
Lines for Post-Brexit, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
01-08/johnson-von-der-leyen-set-out-rival-red-lines-for-post-brexit [http://perma.cc/RW8M-KXT4] 
(reporting that “Johnson said that ‘any future partnership must not involve any kind of alignment’ 
with EU rules and standards or be subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice” and that 
“Johnson [said] his ‘immediate priority’ is to get the Withdrawal Agreement passed into law and im-
plemented by Jan. 31”). 
 117 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13–14 (stating that a new sys-
tem for dispute resolution will need to be adopted after the UK leaves the EU). 
 118 Id. at 13, 15. 
 119 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1], Explanatory Notes ¶¶ 23–
24 (“The Bill, therefore, amends the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 . . . . It also includes a power to allow 
Ministers, following consultation with the judiciary, to change how the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
provides for courts to interpret saved historic CJEU case law after the implementation period. Regula-
tions may enable named members of the judiciary to determine the test (and the relevant considera-
tions to apply to it) in deciding whether to depart from any retained EU law.”). 
 120 See id.; European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 6(4) (UK), http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] 
(“But—(a) the Supreme Court is not bound by any retained EU case law, (b) the High Court of Justi-
ciary is not bound by any retained EU case law . . . .”). 
 121 See European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1], Explanatory Notes 
¶ 19 (“The UK and the EU have agreed that the UK’s exit will be followed by a time-limited imple-
mentation period, which will last until 11.00pm on 31 December 2020 (‘IP completion day’).”); 
DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 65 (establishing that the Article 50 process 
will take two years, but even beyond that “a phased process of implementation, in which the UK, the 
EU institutions and Member States prepare for the new arrangements that will exist between us, will 
be in our mutual interest”). 
 122 Boris Johnson: No-Deal Only Alternative to Brexit Plan, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2019), https://
www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-49906702 [https://perma.cc/72SK-D5AJ] (reporting that “Johnson 
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2. The UK’s Statements Regarding Choice of Law Rules Post-Brexit 
On August 22, 2017, the UK government published a paper titled Provid-
ing a Cross-Border Civil Judicial Cooperation Framework: A Future Partner-
ship Paper, which laid out the government’s vision of its relationship with ex-
isting EU law in the field of “civil judicial cooperation.”123 The partnership 
paper stressed the importance of maintaining a positive relationship between 
EU and UK jurisprudence because it is estimated that forty percent of all 
commercial arbitrations have English law as the governing law.124 The paper 
expressed the UK’s desire to reach an agreement with the EU that broadly pre-
serves existing principles and ensures a positive relationship in the future.125 
The paper also expressed its intention to maintain Rome I as UK national law 
for the time being.126 
Reflecting this intention, the comprehensive agreement with the EU states 
that between January 31, 2020 and December 31, 2020, Rome I will continue 
                                                                                                                           
said no-deal was not an outcome the government was seeking, but ‘it is an outcome for which we are 
ready’” and that others have responded to the plan and “branded [it] as ‘extreme’ and ‘doomed to 
failure’”); Theresa May Won’t Rule Out ‘No-Deal’ Brexit, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.
bbc.com/news/uk-politics-46384207 [https://perma.cc/4ZAJ-HP5C] (reporting that Theresa May 
stated, “if MPs ‘voted down’ her deal in December ‘then obviously decisions would have to be taken’ 
and no-deal planning would be stepped up”); see also DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Cm. 9417, at 9 (noting that one of the goals of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”); Joe Mayes & 
Greg Ritchie, Boris Johnson Cancels 2020 Tax Cut for Businesses: U.K. Votes, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 
18, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-18/boris-johnson-faces-questions-over-
his-love-life-u-k-votes [https://perma.cc/4SK2-VEGF] (“[Johnson] made his pitch to business leaders 
at the confederation of British Industry in London: let him get Brexit out of the way, and use the ensu-
ing certainty to help the economy grow . . . . [Johnson] said his Brexit deal ‘gives business complete 
stability and certainty as [the UK] come[s] out in January.’”). 
 123 HER MAJESTY’S GOV’T, supra note 11, at 1 (citing that the paper reflected the Government’s 
summary based off of research and input from third parties); see also Position Paper on Judicial Co-
operation in Civil and Commercial Matters, at 1–2 (July 12, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/files/essential-principles-civil-commercial-matters_en_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
27PJ-R8ZS] (“The Withdrawal Agreement should ensure that the relevant provisions of Union law on 
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement applicable on the withdrawal date continue to govern judi-
cial proceedings and procedures in civil and commercial matters pending on the withdrawal date.”). 
This partnership paper was a response to the EU’s position paper on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and 
Commercial Matters published on July 13, 2017, in which the EU expressed that the withdrawal 
agreement should cover Rome I and that all relevant provisions of Rome I should continue to apply to 
contracts that were created before the Withdrawal date. See id. 
 124 See HER MAJESTY’S GOV’T, supra note 11, at 5 (citing a 2010 International Arbitration Sur-
vey from the University of London, for the prominence of English law and noting that “Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have their own separate judicial systems . . . [but that the UK] will, of course, con-
tinue to work with them, and stakeholders in Scotland and Ireland, to ensure a future civil judicial 
cooperation agreement benefits all parts of the UK”). 
 125 See id. at 6 (“The UK will therefore seek an agreement with the EU that allows for close and 
comprehensive cross-border civil judicial cooperation on a reciprocal basis, which reflects closely the 
substantive principles of cooperation under the current EU framework”). 
 126 See id. (indicating the UK’s intention to convert Rome I and Rome II into UK “domestic 
law”). 
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to apply.127 To further clarify the status of EU law, Parliament passed The 2018 
Withdrawal Act and the 2020 Withdrawal Agreement.128 The legislation out-
lines the initial relationship that the former EU laws will have in the UK.129 
According to the bills, EU legislation will be incorporated as domestic UK law 
after the UK leaves the EU.130 Any EU case law promulgated before “exit day” 
that interprets an unmodified regulation must continue to be utilized by the 
courts.131 The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill, however, put 
into place the ability for “[a] Minister of the Crown” to enact regulations dic-
tating when courts are or are not required to follow prior EU precedent.132 The 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See Practical Law Dispute Resolution, Brexit: Implications for Civil Justice and Judicial Co-
operation, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-019-0548 
[https://perma.cc/BF3N-9N8Y] [hereinafter Brexit Implications] (noting that this transition phase 
would only go into effect if the UK leaves with a deal in place, if a “hard Brexit” occurs there will be 
no established time to allow for the transition); Dwyer & Romo, supra note 3 (reporting that the first 
comprehensive deal brokered between the UK and EU was rejected by Parliament by 432 to 202 on 
January 15, 2019). 
 128 See European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, supra note 2 (reporting that the EU 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 became law on January 23, 2020); EU Withdrawal Act Website, 
supra note 4 (reporting that the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 was given Royal Assent, or became law, 
on June 29, 2018). 
 129 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U]; European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1] (UK). 
 130 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16 , § 3 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating that “direct EU 
legislation” will be transformed into UK domestic law once the UK leaves the EU and defining “direct 
EU legislation” as all EU regulations, subject to some limitations, but that those limitations do not 
apply to Rome I); European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1] cl. 25 (UK) 
(indicating that there were no substantive changes made to section 3). 
 131 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, §§ 6(3), 6(5) (UK), http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating in 6.3 
that “[a]ny question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law is to be decided, so 
far as that law is unmodified on or after exit day and so far as they are relevant to it—(a) in accord-
ance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law, and (b) having regard 
(among other things) to the limits, immediately before exit day, of EU competences”). 
 132 European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1] cl. 26 (UK) (“[A]fter sub-
section (5) [of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act] insert—‘(5A) A Minister of the Crown may by 
regulations provide for—(a) a court or tribunal to be a relevant court or (as the case may be) a relevant 
tribunal for the purposes of this section, (b) the extent to which, or circumstances in which, a relevant 
court or relevant tribunal is not to be bound by retained EU case law, (c) the test which a relevant 
court or relevant tribunal must apply in deciding whether to depart from any retained EU case law, or 
(d) considerations which are to be relevant to—(i) the Supreme Court or the High Court of Justiciary 
in applying the test mentioned in subsection (5), or (ii) a relevant court or relevant tribunal in applying 
any test provided for by virtue of paragraph (c) above. (5B) Regulations under subsection (5A) may 
(among other things) provide for—(a) the High Court of Justiciary to be a relevant court when sitting 
otherwise than as mentioned in subsection (4)(b)(i) and (ii), (b) the extent to which, or circumstances 
in which, a relevant court or relevant tribunal not being bound by retained EU case law includes (or 
does not include) that court or tribunal not being bound by retained domestic case law which relates to 
retained EU case law, (c) other matters arising in relation to retained domestic case law which relates 
to retained EU case law (including by making provision of a kind which could be made in relation to 
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latest draft of the Rome I changes needed to convert the treaty into domestic 
UK law were released on March 29, 2019, however, these changes were most-
ly stylistic in nature.133 Aside from these pieces of legislation there is very little 
guidance on what the relationship will look like and how laws will be trans-
formed after exit day.134 
III. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S OPTIONS FOR CHANGES TO ROME I 
There are a few different ways in which the UK can consider handling the 
retained Rome I language post-Brexit.135 On one end, the UK can choose to do 
nothing and adopt the language proposed to transform Rome I into domestic 
law without further review on the matter.136 Conversely, it can conduct a com-
plete overhaul of the regulation.137 If the UK wishes to promote its stated goal 
                                                                                                                           
retained EU case law), or (d) the test mentioned in paragraph (c) of subsection (5A) or the considera-
tions mentioned in paragraph (d) of that subsection to be determined (whether with or without the 
consent of a Minister of the Crown) by a person mentioned in subsection (5C)(a) to (e) or by more 
than one of those persons acting jointly. (5C) Before making regulations under subsection (5A), a 
Minister of the Crown must consult—(a) the President of the Supreme Court, (b) the Lord Chief Jus-
tice of England and Wales, (c) the Lord President of the Court of Session, (d) the Lord Chief Justice 
of Northern Ireland, (e) the Senior President of Tribunals, and (f) such other persons as the Minister of 
the Crown considers appropriate. (5D) No regulations may be made under subsection (5A) after IP 
completion day.’”).  
 133 See Exiting the European Union Private International Law 2019, SI 2019/834, art. 10 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/834/made/data.pdf [https://perma.cc/33QJ-U84C] (proposing 
amendments to Rome I that includes changes such as replacing “Member States” with “relevant 
states” in Article 3(4)”); Practical Law Dispute Resolution, The Implications of Brexit for Civil Justice 
and Judicial Co-operation: Toolkit, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.thomson
reuters.com/w-017-8765 [https://perma.cc/4XYR-2V4D] [hereinafter Brexit Toolkit] (indicating that 
the first version of the changes to be made to Rome I in order to convert it into domestic law were 
released on December 12, 2018 and a second version was released on January 23, 2019). 
 134 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (reserving the 
right of Parliament to change the new rules on an ad hoc basis); Brexit Toolkit, supra note 133 (citing 
the draft statutory instruments that have been released to convert existing EU law into “domestic law” 
after exit day in the field of “civil justice and judicial co-operation”); Lawless et al., supra note 3 
(reporting that lawmakers rejected the Brexit deal for a third time); Brexit: UK and EU Agree Delay, 
supra note 1 (reporting that another extension was granted and the UK is now set to leave the EU on 
October 31, 2019). 
 135 See infra notes 136–137 and accompanying text. 
 136 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, §§ 1, 2 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (holding on June 26, 
2018 that the European Communities Act of 1972 will be “repealed on exit day” and that “EU-derived 
domestic legislation, as it has effect in domestic law immediately before exit day, continues to have 
effect in domestic law on and after exit day”); Exiting the European Union Private International Law, 
supra note 133, (detailing the proposed changes to Rome I, the latest draft of which was released in 
March 2019). 
 137 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (reserving the right 
of Parliament to change the retained EU law on an ad hoc basis). 
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of having a smooth and orderly exit from the EU, it will have to consider the 
effect those changes will have on the various sectors of the population, includ-
ing businesses.138 It is crucial that the choice of law rules be clearly communi-
cated and implemented post-Brexit so that commercially contracting parties 
are able to assess what the default law will be, analyze the benefits and risks 
associated with operating under that default law, and either contract out of the 
provision or make other strategic decisions.139 Without this certainty, parties 
may choose to avoid litigating or arbitrating cases in the UK altogether.140 
Therefore, the UK must carefully decide if, and how, to change their choice of 
law principles.141 
Sections A through D of this Part analyze some of the UK’s options in de-
fining its choice of law rules post-Brexit.142 Specifically, they look at the im-
plications that each option would have on Rome I’s historical principles, illus-
trated through the principle of party autonomy, and on provisions that were 
first implemented through Rome I, illustrated through Rome I’s rules on over-
riding mandatory provisions, and how the changes that would be made to these 
provisions align with Brexit’s goals of maintaining legal certainty and reassert-
ing parliamentary sovereignty.143 
Section A of this Part analyzes what would happen if the UK decided to 
do nothing and keep the retained Rome I language as is.144 Section B discusses 
what would happen if the UK decided to rewrite the choice of law rules.145 
Section C considers what would happen if the UK decided to adopt another 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 10 (defining the scope of Rome I as applying “to contractual 
obligations in civil and commercial matters,” except for defined categories such as “revenue, customs 
or administrative matters”); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S 
EXIT FROM AND NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION, 2017, Cm. 9417, at 9 (UK) (noting 
that one of the goals of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”). 
 139 See Charles R. Calleros, Toward Harmonization and Certainty in Choice-of-Law Rules for 
International Contracts: Should the U.S. Adopt the Equivalent of Rome I? 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 639, 
642–43 (2011) (recognizing that in commercial contracts there is a need for certainty that allows par-
ties to identify what the default laws are in order to contract out of them if they please, or analyze the 
benefits and downsides of the default laws). 
 140 See id. (stressing the importance of certainty to commercially contracting parties). 
 141 See id. at 642 (stating that “legal systems have traditionally placed especially great weight on 
certainty and predictability in their bodies of contract law”); Hallie Detrick, The Sudden Collapse of a 
British Airline Has Caused Chaos for Its Customers, FORTUNE (Feb. 18, 2019), http://fortune.com/
2019/02/18/flybmi-flight-cancellation-collapse/ [https://perma.cc/A3ZG-B7TE] (citing the uncertainty 
caused by Brexit as the cause for the collapse of its airline); David Goodman & Lucy Meakin, Carney 
Says U.K. Slowdown Underscores Need for Brexit Certainty, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-12/carney-says-u-k-slowdown-underscores-need-for-
brexit-certainty [https://perma.cc/7MZH-5N4R] (arguing that slow growth in the UK economy high-
lights “the need for certainty on Brexit”). 
 142 See infra notes 148–265 and accompanying text. 
 143 See infra notes 148–265 and accompanying text. 
 144 See infra notes 148–169 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 170–188 and accompanying text. 
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country’s choice of law principles, specifically it looks at the Brazilian, U.S., 
and Chinese choice of law regimes.146 Section D evaluates what would occur if 
the UK decides to return to the language in the Rome Convention or construct 
its choice of law rules based on common law cases.147 
A. Option 1: Maintain the Choice of Law Principles  
as They Are Written Now 
Under the 2018 Withdrawal Act and 2020 Withdrawal Agreement, Rome 
I will be transformed into UK domestic law on the day the UK leaves the 
EU.148 In accordance with Article 8(1) of the 2018 Withdrawal Act, which al-
lows the UK to make modifications to EU law, the UK published changes to 
Rome I that will go into effect when they leave the EU.149 The only proposed 
changes are stylistic changes and a modification eliminating the mechanism 
for conflict negotiation between EU countries and non-EU countries.150 These 
changes, nevertheless, could be preserved past the proposed December 2020 
deadline if the UK so chooses.151 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See infra notes 189–210 and accompanying text. 
 147 See infra notes 211–265 and accompanying text. 
 148 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 3(1) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U]. “Direct EU legislation, 
so far as operative immediately before exit day, forms part of domestic law on and after exit day.” Id. 
 149 See id. § 8 (“(1) A Minister of the Crown may by regulations make such provision as the Min-
ister considers appropriate to prevent, remedy or mitigate—(a) any failure of retained EU law to oper-
ate effectively, or (b) any other deficiency in retained EU law, arising from the withdrawal of the 
United Kingdom from the EU. (2) Deficiencies in retained EU law are where the Minister considers 
that retained EU law—(a) contains anything which has no practical application in relation to the Unit-
ed Kingdom or any part of it or is otherwise redundant or substantially redundant, (b) confers func-
tions on, or in relation to, EU entities which no longer have functions in that respect under EU law in 
relation to the United Kingdom or any part of it, (c) makes provision for, or in connection with, recip-
rocal arrangements between—(i) the United Kingdom or any part of it or a public authority in the 
United Kingdom, and (ii) the EU, an EU entity, a member State or a public authority in a member 
State, which no longer exist or are no longer appropriate, (d) makes provision for, or in connection 
with, other arrangements which— (i) involve the EU, an EU entity, a member State or a public author-
ity in a member State, or (ii) are otherwise dependent upon the United Kingdom’s membership of the 
EU, and which no longer exist or are no longer appropriate . . . .”); Exiting the European Union Pri-
vate International Law, supra note 133 at art. 12 (detailing the proposed changes to Rome I). 
 150 See Exiting the European Union Private International Law, supra note 133, at art. 12 (detailing 
the proposed changes to Rome I and the revocation of Regulation EC No 662/2009). 
 151 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (reserving the right 
to, but not requiring, Parliament to change any retained EU legislation); European Union (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1], Explanatory Notes ¶ 19 (“The UK and the EU have agreed that 
the UK’s exit will be followed by a time-limited implementation period, which will last until 11.00pm 
on 31 December 2020 (‘IP completion day’).”); Brexit Implications, supra note 127 (indicating what 
constitutes the “post-Brexit transition period”).  
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This would be the easiest option for Parliament to adopt.152 The benefit of 
retaining Rome I in its domestic form is that it would maintain certainty, at 
least in the short term, and promote a smooth transition.153 There is no substan-
tive reason to break from the Rome I principles, as the principles have not been 
cited as a reason to leave the EU.154 In fact, the changes made in Rome I were 
lauded by the Ministry of Justice as positive at the time.155 
One perceived downside of this approach is that it does not advance the 
UK’s goal of reinforcing parliamentary sovereignty because the UK would just 
be adopting the EU’s language.156 The English courts, however, may no longer 
be bound by the decisions issued by the Court of Justice of the European Un-
ion (CJEU) after they leave the EU.157 The English court’s interpretations of 
the retained language will be independent from the CJEU’s.158 Such uniformity 
with the EU, although beneficial for companies, is not necessarily one of the 
major goals for the UK as they attempt to navigate leaving the EU.159 Thus, the 
uniformity and certainty are likely to erode over time because there is no guaran-
                                                                                                                           
 152 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 2 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (detailing that on exit 
day the language of Rome I will be transformed into domestic law); Hunt & Wheeler, supra note 1 
(addressing that there are many questions that Parliament has to answer given that there is no deal 
currently in place, including fundamental issues such as will citizens of other EU Member States have 
to move out of the UK, noticeably absent from this extensive list are choice of law issues). 
 153 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 65 (expressing the desire for a 
seamless exit and wanting to avoid the country metaphorically plummeting off a cliff). 
 154 Mauldin & Friedman, supra note 97 (citing that the three main reasons why Britain voted to 
leave the EU were “economics,” “sovereignty,” and “political elitism”); Giesela Rühl, Judicial Coop-
eration in Civil and Commercial Matters After Brexit: Which Way Forward? 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
99, 100 (2018) (citing that judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters is not a politically 
pressing topic in Brexit). 
 155 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3, 6 (stating that Article 3 and Article 9 of Rome I 
are “improvement[s]” from Article 3 and Article 7 of the Rome Convention). 
 156 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 2 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (detailing that on exit 
day the language of Rome I will be transformed into domestic law); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EURO-
PEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (asserting that the “sovereignty of Parliament is a fundamental principle 
of the UK constitution”). 
 157 See European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-1, HC Bill [1] cl. 26 (UK) (stating 
that “[a] minister of the Crown may by regulations provide for — . . . (b) the extent to which, or cir-
cumstances in which, a relevant court or relevant tribunal is not to be bound by retained EU case law, 
(c) the test which a relevant court or relevant tribunal must apply in deciding whether to depart from 
any retained EU case law”); see also DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 
(asserting that one of the fundamental tenants of the UK constitution is parliamentary sovereignty). 
 158 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 6(1) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (detailing in section 
6(1) that ECJ decisions no longer have any force in UK courts after exit day). 
 159 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (emphasizing that “it will 
also be important for business in both the UK and the EU to have as much certainty as possible as 
early as possible” but also that it is critical to “ensure that our legislatures and courts will be the final 
decision makers in our country”). 
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tee that the UK courts will interpret a legal issue the same way as the CJEU.160 
The likely differences that would arise in the interpretation of the retained Rome 
I would actually help distinguish the UK system from the EU over time.161 
Additionally, parliamentary sovereignty would not likely be questioned 
with regard to historical principles, such as Article 3, because they were not 
created by the EU or implemented in the UK through a regulation.162 The UK 
consented, for example, to the principles of party autonomy existing in its 
choice of law scheme by adopting it in the Rome Convention and not entering 
a reservation.163 Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made that accepting, 
for example, provisions such as Article 9, which expanded the scope of manda-
tory provisions beyond common law precedent, undermines parliamentary 
sovereignty, especially because the UK entered a reservation to its predecessor 
in the Rome Convention.164 Without further explanation, it appears that the UK 
is copying and pasting EU law into its own laws without acknowledging that 
these provisions go beyond what it had ever previously agreed to or the trend 
in common law.165 The counter-argument, in this case, is that the reservation to 
Article 7(1) in the Rome Convention was based on an objection to the level of 
ambiguity in the language not overriding mandatory provisions themselves.166 
In fact, the Ministry of Justice previously stated that Article 9 generally tracked 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See Rühl, supra note 154, at 119–20 (explaining that keeping EU legislation, but not interpret-
ing that language in accordance with the ECJ seems to be a “diverging—and seemingly irreconcila-
ble—position[]”). 
 161 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 6(1) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating that UK 
courts “[are] not bound by any principles laid down, or any decision made, on or after exit day by the 
European Court”); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (stating that one of 
the goals of Brexit is to reassert its sovereignty). 
 162 See Zhang, supra note 14, at 516 (citing that the principle of party autonomy traces back to the 
sixteenth century); see also TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288 (“A regulation shall have gen-
eral application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.”). 
 163 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (stat-
ing that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, allows for reservations in which a State can 
“purport[] to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their applica-
tion to that State”); Behr, supra note 52, at 235–36 (explaining that the Rome Convention had to be 
adopted as national law in each Member State which meant Member States may have different itera-
tions of the Rome Convention because the Convention has undergone various transformations, and 
that the Rome Convention allowed states to choose not to adopt certain portions of it by entering res-
ervations).  
 164 See Rome I Website, supra note 13 (reporting that the UK entered a reservation to Article 7(1) 
“on the grounds of uncertainty” and that Article 9(3) to Rome I was a “substantive change”). 
 165 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13; EU Withdrawal Act, supra 
note 9 (stating that the “Act is essentially a giant ‘copy and paste’ exercise”). 
 166 See Lando, supra note 74 (reporting that those in the UK that were working on the Rome 
Convention thought Article 7(1) would cause “confusion . . . uncertainty . . . expense . . . and . . . de-
lay”) (internal quotations omitted); Rome I Website, supra note 13 (noting that the UK did not adopt 
Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention because the UK believed it would have caused too much uncer-
tainty). 
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English law.167 This is an explanation that interested parties will have to search 
for if the UK leaves the Rome I language in place and does nothing further.168 
Additionally, other inquiries may arise, including whether the provision also 
aligns with Scottish and Northern Irish common law.169 
B. Option 2: Scrap the Entire Regulation and Start Over 
Conversely, the UK could completely disregard Rome I and rewrite the 
entire regulation.170 This approach would allow the UK to decisively separate 
itself from the EU and leave no question as to whether the regulation is “UK” 
law.171 Nevertheless, it is unclear, given the positive reaction by the Ministry of 
Justice to the changes in Rome I, what positive substantive changes would be 
implemented to make the new regulation distinguishable from Rome I.172 
For example, the UK could attempt to distinguish itself from the EU by 
adopting a contradictory approach for all, or many, of the principles.173 The 
2018 Withdrawal Act gives Parliament the power to repeal or alter any former 
EU laws.174 For instance, the UK could decide to reject the well-established 
principle of party autonomy, found in Article 3 of Rome I, and return to the 
principle of lex loci contractus, meaning the law that governs is the “law of 
place where the contract was made.”175 Yet, if these historical principles were 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6 (stating that although there is “no conclusive 
English authority as to the situation where the law applicable to the contract is not English law” that 
“Article 9(3) generally reflects the English law position” and constitutes an “improvement in terms of 
legal certainty”). 
 168 See THE EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, SCRUTINISING BREXIT: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, 
2016-1, HL 33, at 4 (UK) (stating that Parliament taking the time to closely review laws will create 
“an ‘audit trail’ for future generations”); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9–
10 (wanting to provide certainty and to ensure that laws will not change immediately and provide 
certainty and information to businesses about what the changes will likely be); EU Withdrawal Act, 
supra note 9 (stating that the “Act is essentially a giant ‘copy and paste’ exercise”). 
 169 See HER MAJESTY’S GOV’T, supra note 11, at 4–5 (citing the 2010 International Arbitration 
Survey: Choices in International Arbitration from the University of London and noting that “Scotland 
and Northern Ireland have their own separate judicial systems”). 
 170 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (“Retained direct 
principal EU legislation cannot be modified by any primary or subordinate legislation other than — 
(a) an Act of Parliament . . . .”). 
 171 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (stating that one of the main 
twelve goals of Brexit was for the UK to “take control” of their laws and reinforce that the “legisla-
tures and courts [are] the final decision makers”).  
 172 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3–8 (concluding that most of modifications in 
Rome I were “improvements” and if not improvements they struck a “satisfactory balance”). 
 173 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating that Parlia-
ment has the ability to change any former EU laws). 
 174 Id. 
 175 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 10 (defining the principle of party autonomy); Zhang, supra 
note 14, at 516 (defining the principle of lex loci contracus). 
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to be cast aside, it would likely make the UK a less attractive forum.176 For 
example, if the principle of lex loci contractus were to be adopted, contracting 
parties would no longer have the ability to choose the law that governs their con-
tracts.177 Although this would create an incredible amount of uncertainty, it 
would be a bold assertion of the UK’s sovereignty because it would create a sys-
tem of choice of law rules that are clearly distinguishable from that of the EU.178 
Although there may be uncertainty associated with eliminating the histor-
ical principles like Article 3, the same is not as easily said about principles that 
were implemented into UK law only through Rome I, such as the principle of 
enforcing the mandatory overriding principles of a third country.179 The UK 
could reject this provision and instead adopt a rule that focuses on unenforcea-
ble contracts that contradict public policy.180 This re-framing of the exception 
in terms of public policy aligns with how some other countries, including the 
U.S, approach the unenforceability of contracts.181 
The UK did not have a choice about which rules would be implemented 
into UK law because Rome I was a regulation that was automatically “binding 
in its entirety.”182 Therefore, if the UK were to reject any rules that did not ex-
ist in UK law before Rome I, such as those contained in Article 9, it would re-
inforce parliamentary sovereignty by establishing that only those rules that had 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Yuko Nishitani, Party Autonomy in Contemporary Private International Law, 59 JAPANESE 
Y.B. INT’L L. 300, 303–04 (2016) (summarizing that in the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts, which were adopted in March 2015 as a culmination of one hun-
dred years of individuals and institutions trying to create uniform international laws, “set forth cardi-
nal conflicts rules on party autonomy . . . [and] the purpose of the Hague Principles is to promote 
party autonomy”). 
 177 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating that Parlia-
ment has the ability to change any former EU laws); Nishitani, supra note 176 (summarizing the 
Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts); Zhang, supra note 13, at 
516 (defining the principle of lex loci contracus). 
 178 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (emphasizing that the UK 
should be making its laws, not the EU, and assert parliamentary sovereignty). 
 179 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288 (stating that a regulation is binding on Member 
States and no changes can be made to the language); Rome I Website, supra note 13 (stating that the 
UK entered a reservation to Article 7(1) regarding mandatory overriding provisions and that Article 
9(3), containing the overriding mandatory provisions, in Rome I was a “substantive change”). 
 180 See Voser, supra note 68, at 327–28 & n.42 (stating that parties’ “choice of law will not be 
upheld if it is contrary to a ‘fundamental policy’ of another state whose law would otherwise be the 
applicable law” and that although more restrictive in an interstate situation where “the law chosen by 
the parities would make enforceable a contract flatly unenforceable in a state whose law would other-
wise apply” the United States is less restrictive in an international context as demonstrated by the 
Ninth Circuit declining to uphold a Saudi decree and make a payment unenforceable, even though the 
payment would be “flatly unenforceable in Alabama” in Northrop Corp v. Triad Int’l Mktg, 811 F.2d 
1265 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 181 See Voser, supra note 180 and accompanying text.  
 182 See TFEU 2012 Consolidated Version art. 288 (stating that a regulation is binding on Member 
States and there can be no changes to the language). 
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a pre-Rome I basis in the UK and were not solely retained EU law would re-
main following Brexit.183 
The downside of this approach is that it would produce uncertainty as 
businesses adjusted to the exclusions of rules that have been in place for the 
past decade.184 Additionally, no substantive reason has been stated in support 
of eliminating these provisions.185 Thus, these provisions would be cast aside 
purely because the UK wants to break from the EU.186 There is a strong argu-
ment that just wanting to break from the EU is not enough reason to eliminate 
these choice of law rules.187 Accordingly, the impact that eliminating these 
provisions will have on demonstrating parliamentary sovereignty is mini-
mal.188 
C. Option 3: Adopt Another Country’s Choice of Law Rules 
Instead of trying to create an entirely new provision, the UK could incor-
porate the choice of law rules that another country uses to resolve international 
disputes into their national law.189 Given that the United States is an influential 
common law country, one choice would be to adopt choice of law rules that 
tracked the United States’ rules found in the Second Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws and the Uniform Commercial Codes.190 There are other codes that the 
                                                                                                                           
 183 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (emphasizing that one of the 
main goals of Brexit was asserting parliamentary sovereignty); Rome I Website, supra note 13 (stating 
that the UK entered a reservation to Article 7(1) regarding mandatory overriding provisions and that 
Article 9(3) in Rome I was a “substantive change”). 
 184 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9 (citing that “providing legal 
certainty” is an important goal of Brexit); Rome I Website, supra note 13 (indicating that Rome I has 
applied since December 17, 2009).  
 185 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (citing that “providing 
legal certainty” is an important goal of Brexit, but also reasserting parliamentary sovereignty and 
ensuring that the UK is the one promulgating their laws, not the EU); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra 
note 56, at 3, 6 (stating that the changes made to Article 3 and Article 7 of the Rome Convention were 
generally “improvements” and gave the UK “legal certainty”). 
 186 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 187 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9 (citing that one of the twelve 
goals of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”); Rome I Website, supra note 13 (noting that the UK 
did not adopt Article 7(1) of the Rome Convention because it was perceived to cause too much uncer-
tainty); Zhang, supra note 14, at 516 (citing that the principle of party autonomy traces back to 
Charles Dumoulin, a Frenchman from the sixteenth century). 
 188 DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (stating that one of the funda-
mental goals of Brexit is to “take control of our own affairs” and to reestablish parliamentary sover-
eignty). 
 189 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (“Retained direct 
principal EU legislation cannot be modified by any primary or subordinate legislation other than — 
(a) an Act of Parliament . . . .”). 
 190 See Calleros, supra note 139, at 665, 672 (noting that the UCC governs “the sale of goods”); 
Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1044 (1987) (stating 
that the “Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, requires a court to apply the law of that state which 
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UK could choose from, including codes from China or Brazil.191 Transplanting 
another system would likely have a significant effect on the substantive choice 
of law rules.192 
 For example, historical principles, such as the principle of party autono-
my, may be eliminated or modified, depending on the system adopted.193 In 
most circumstances, the Brazilian choice of law rules embrace the principle of 
lex loci contractus, and the law is silent on whether it will allow parties to 
choose the law governing their contracts or not.194 The Chinese and U.S. sys-
tems have similar conceptions of party autonomy to Rome I, but the Chinese 
choice of law rules regarding party autonomy do not operate in the same way 
                                                                                                                           
has the closest relationship to the parties and issues involved”); see also U.C.C. § 1-301 (AM. LAW INST. 
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012) (explaining the parties’ power to choose applicable law); Legal Systems of 
the World, SAINT, http://saint-claire.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Legal-Systems-of-the-World.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V8M6-L3GE] (reporting that common law, which is the system utilized in the 
United States, originated in the UK). 
 191 See Calleros, supra note 139, at 666–68 (summarizing the factors that the United States uses 
to decide choice of law); Alice M. Vickers, The Choice of Law Clause in Contracts Between Parties 
of Developing and Developed Nations, 11 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 617, 624–25 (1981) (analyzing the 
choice of law systems in Brazil); David Dai et al., China Promulgates Specific Conflict Law Govern-
ing Foreign-Related Civil Relations, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 23, 2010), https://s3.amazon
aws.com/documents.lexology.com/06fd4805-e725-40d4-9963-607409296d71.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4KHN-3F8F ] (containing a letter published by McDermott Will & Emery announcing the creation of 
the Law of the Application of Law for Foreign-Related Civil Relations of the People’s Republic of 
China, which summarized and provided clarification to China’s existing choice of law rules); Most 
Influential Countries, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/best-
international-influence [https://perma.cc/AA6N-N6A2]. These countries are chosen as representative 
of three different ways of approaching choice of law principles: the United States, a prominent com-
mon-law country, has a system based on “factors”; China, a civil-law country, has more set rules, 
similar to the current Rome I standard; and Brazil’s fundamental principles differ from that of Rome I. 
See Calleros, supra note 139, at 666–68; Vickers, supra, at 624–25; David Dai et al., supra. 
 192 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 10 (defining the principle of party autonomy); Vickers, 
supra note 191, at 624–25 (stating that Brazilian law, at least in certain circumstances, follows the 
principle of lex loci contractus, which means the law of the place where the contract was formed gov-
erns, not the parties’ choice). 
 193 See Vickers, supra note 191, at 624–25 (stating that Brazilian law follows the principal of lex 
loci contractus, except when Brazil is the place of performance, which means that rather than the 
parties being able to choose which law covers their contracts under the principle of party autonomy, 
the law that governs is the law of the forum where the contract was made); see also U.C.C. § 1-301 
(noting that in the United States the ability for parties to make a choice can be limited by the transac-
tion needing to “bear[] a reasonable relation to [the] state”); Luo Junming, Choice of Law for Con-
tracts in China: A Proposal for the Objectivization of Standards and Their Use in Conflicts of Law, 6 
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 439, 440 (1996) (reporting that the principle of party autonomy is prom-
ulgated in Article 5 of the Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving 
Foreign Interest and states that the parties have the ability to choose the law that applies to their con-
tract). 
 194 See Vickers, supra note 191, at 624–25 (clarifying that although Brazilian law follows the 
principle of lex loci contractus, it is not always clear because if performance is in Brazil, the courts 
will follow Brazilian law and lex loci contractus is only applied to contracts created outside of Brazil 
and where their performance will occur outside of Brazil). Further complicating the matter is the fact 
that Brazilian national law does not make it clear if party autonomy is permissible. See id. 
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as Rome I.195 The Chinese courts have interpreted their choice of law rules to 
require an explicit provision in order to recognize that the parties made a 
choice.196 This is the Chinese court’s interpretation of the rule, however, and 
the UK would not have to interpret the language the same way.197 In fact, some 
courts in China do recognize implied choice, but utilizing this language may 
reintroduce the ambiguity around the viability of implied choice that Rome I 
sought to eliminate in the first place.198 
In contrast, the U.S.’s rules around party autonomy do reflect those in Ar-
ticle 3, because it acknowledges both express and implied choice.199 Neverthe-
less, just because the United States has a similar provision when it comes to 
the system of party autonomy does not mean its choice of law regime is similar 
                                                                                                                           
 195 See U.C.C. § 1-301 (allowing parties to make a choice regarding which law will govern their 
contracts); Junming, supra note 193, at 440–42 (reporting that the principle of party autonomy is 
promulgated in Article 5 of the Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China on Economic Contracts In-
volving Foreign Interest and states that “[t]he parties to a contract may choose the proper law applica-
ble to the settlement of contract disputes” and Chinese law breaks from other countries in its choice of 
law principles because the judiciary only recognizes choice of law clauses if they are contained in an 
express provision, however, in practice, implied choice of law choices are utilized). 
 196 See Junming, supra note 193, at 441–42 (“As to the manner of choosing proper law, there is 
no definite regulation in Chinese law. However, in the judicial interpretation of the Supreme Court of 
the People’s Republic of China, it is provided that the parties to the contract shall do so by means of 
an express choice-of-law clause.”). 
 197 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (reserving the right of 
Parliament to change the new rules on an ad hoc basis); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Cm. 9417, at 13 (emphasizing that laws affecting the UK should be promulgated in the UK, not the 
EU). 
 198 Compare Junming, supra note 193, at 441–42 (noting that even though the Supreme Court of 
the People’s Republic of China stated that parties have to use an explicit choice of law clause, “the 
implied selection of the proper choice of law operates in practice in China but is not sanctioned under 
color of law”), with MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56 (reporting that Rome I clarified that parties 
can demonstrate that they made a choice of law by making “reference to the terms of the contract or 
the circumstances of the case,” rather than needing to point to an explicit clause). 
 199 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (“[The 
parties have chosen the law if:] (1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contrac-
tual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have re-
solved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue. (2) The law of the state cho-
sen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular 
issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement 
directed to that issue, unless either (a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or 
the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or (b) application of the 
law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially 
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the 
rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by 
the parties. (3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the local law of 
the state of the chosen law.”) (emphasis added); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56 (stating that 
Rome I clarified that a choice can be made if it is “clearly demonstrated by reference to the terms of 
the contract” and not only in express terms). 
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to that contained in Rome I.200 Although the differences noted between the 
Brazilian, U.S., Chinese, and UK choice of law rules are only a snapshot of 
how this historical principle operates in other countries, it demonstrates the 
danger of adopting another country’s approach: elimination or modification of 
entrenched principles resulting in uncertainty.201 An alternative option is that 
the UK could borrow from these other countries only modestly and keep the 
effect of the provisions substantially the same.202 This does not promote the 
goals of Brexit, however, because merely copying another country’s rules does 
little to establish parliamentary sovereignty and uncertainty would still arise as 
parties adapt to the changes and courts interpret any ambiguity.203 
                                                                                                                           
 200 Compare Calleros, supra note 139, at 666–69 (critiquing the Second Restatement approach on 
how to determine choice of law in the absence of a choice for “advanc[ing] the concept of dépeçage 
by inviting courts to apply its test separately to each issue in a contracts dispute, and raising the possi-
bility for applying the laws of different states to different issues, thus multiplying the opportunities for 
uncertainty and litigation” and laying out the various factors that the United States utilizes to deter-
mine choice of law, including general principles contained in Section 6 of the Restatement stating: 
“[a] court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on 
choice of law; (2) [w]hen there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable 
rule of law include: (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of 
the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in 
the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic poli-
cies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) 
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied,” and the seven factors utilized to 
determine what law governs in the absence of a choice: “Section 188 of the Restatement: Law Gov-
erning in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties: (1) [t]he rights and duties of the parties with 
respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that 
issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated 
in § 6; (2) [i]n the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be 
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, 
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place 
of incorporation and place of business of the parties”), with Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 6, 11 (stat-
ing in Article 4 that if the parties have not made a choice then the contract will be governed by the law 
of the country where the seller lives). 
 201 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9. (announcing that one of the 
main goals of Brexit was to “provid[e] certainty and clarity”); Calleros, supra note 139, at 666–68 
(stating that the U.S. system utilizes a variety of factors to determine which law applies); Junming, 
supra note 193, at 440–42 (reporting that the principle of party autonomy is promulgated in Article 5 
of the Law of the Peoples’ Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Interest and 
states that “the parties to a contract may choose the proper law applicable to the settlement of contract 
disputes” and that unlike other countries, the courts only recognize a choice of law clause if it is con-
tained in an express provision, however, implicit choice of law clauses are utilized in practice). 
 202 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (reflecting that parties can make a 
choice either explicitly or the choice can be inferred); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56 (noting 
that Rome I clarifies that a party can make a choice of law either expressly or the choice can be in-
ferred from “the terms of the contract”). 
 203 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (citing that “providing 
legal certainty” is an important goal of Brexit and that if possible after Brexit the same rules will be in 
effect). 
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Similar arguments can be made when analyzing how adopting another 
country’s laws would affect principles implemented through Rome I, but there 
is a stronger argument for why implementing another country’s laws would 
actually be a good approach with regards to these principles.204 Taking overrid-
ing mandatory provisions as an example, few countries have a rule regarding 
overriding mandatory provisions and instead state that contracts will be unen-
forceable if they violate public policy.205 
If the UK decides it wants to eliminate overriding mandatory provisions, 
it could adopt a general public policy exception, or if it wants to keep overrid-
ing mandatory provisions but in a more limited scope, it could adopt language 
establishing overriding mandatory provisions that apply only to UK coun-
tries.206 Adopting another country’s language would help to provide certainty 
because the parties could look at how that country’s courts have applied the 
public policy exception to gain insight into how it might be applied in the 
UK.207 Nevertheless, uncertainty could still be introduced if there is already 
uncertainty in the language that the UK would be looking to adopt.208 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See Junming, supra note 193, at 445–46 (stating that China has a public policy exception in 
their choice of law rules); Vickers, supra note 191, at 625 (reporting that in Brazilian law public poli-
cy can circumvent an express choice made by the parties); Voser, supra note 68, at 327 (quoting the 
language of section 187 that “the choice of law will not be upheld if it is contrary to a ‘fundamental 
policy’ of another state whose law would otherwise be . . . applicable”).  
 205 See Junming, supra note 193, at 444–46 (stating that in China there are two statutory re-
strictions on the ability for parties to choose the law that governs their contracts, (1) in Article 5(2), 
the law of China applies to contracts where performance occurs in China and parties cannot contract 
around Chinese law through party autonomy, and (2) in Article 150 which operates as a public policy 
limitation, the other possible restriction comes from the courts and their ability to disregard the choice 
of law clause if certain prerequisites are met); Vickers, supra note 191, at 625 (“[In Brazil] public 
policy can be used as an excuse to avoid an express choice of law.”); Voser, supra note 68, at 327 
(quoting the language of section 187 that “the choice of law will not be upheld if it is contrary to a 
‘fundamental policy’ of another state whose law would otherwise be . . . applicable” and hypothesiz-
ing that in the United States “a special treatment of mandatory rules is principally not necessary, be-
cause based on an ad hoc functional approach combined with depecage, foreign mandatory rules can 
be taken into account and applied in the normal course of the choice-of-law process”). 
 206 See Regulation (EC) 593/2008, at 6, 15 (demonstrating that Rome I has a public policy excep-
tion, promulgated in Article 21, but it is limited to violating the “public policy (ordre public) of the 
forum”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 ( “(2) The law of the state chosen by 
the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied . . . unless either . . . (b) appli-
cation of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a 
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and which, 
under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice 
of law by the parties.”); Junming, supra note 205 and accompanying text (noting that China has a 
public exception policy in its choice of law rules, but does have restrictions on party autonomy when 
performance is to occur in China). 
 207 See Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int’l Mktg. S.A., 811 F.2d 1265, 1270–71 (9th Cir. 1987) (refus-
ing to apply a Saudi decree, in the United States, that would have invalidated the contract because the 
commission was unenforceable in Saudi Arabia in an international context, reasoning that choice of 
law provisions are important to having smooth international transactions and the choice of law provi-
sions should be upheld unless there are “strong reasons” not to); Barnes Group, Inc. v. C & C Prods., 
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In terms of parliamentary sovereignty, because the public policy excep-
tion is so widely used, the adoption of another country’s rule is less likely to be 
seen as undermining parliamentary sovereignty, but rather, seen as the UK 
making an active choice to break from the EU.209 Following other countries’ 
trends gives the appearance that the UK has chosen to mold its laws to be uni-
form with the rest of the world, rather than the EU, which reinforces parlia-
mentary sovereignty.210 
D. Option 4: Return to a Prior Code 
If the UK was keen on rejecting Rome I, but wanted to avoid drafting a 
new regulation from scratch or adopting another country’s rules, it could return 
to a prior regime of choice of law principles.211 This approach would allow for 
some certainty because there would be a body of English common law to look 
back on.212 Nevertheless, there could still be a period of uncertainty as parties 
adjusted to the changes.213 
This option also raises an important question: which prior laws should the 
UK return to? One choice under this approach would be to return to the Con-
tracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, which enacted the Rome Convention of 
                                                                                                                           
Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1026–27, 1032 (4th Cir. 1983) (refusing to uphold a contract that chose Ohio law 
because covenant’s not to compete were “flatly unenforceable” in Alabama and upholding the cove-
nants would violate a “fundamental policy” of Alabama). 
 208 See Northrop Corp., 811 F.2d at 1270–71 (illustrating that American courts appear to be less 
likely to invalidate a contract in an international situation based on public policy, making it unclear 
whether it would led to more lenient application of the public policy rule if the UK adopted this lan-
guage); Barnes Group, Inc., 716 F.2d at 1026–27, 1032; Voser, supra note 68, at 327–28 (analyzing 
that American courts seem to be treating choices of law made between American parties differently 
than choices of law made with international parties). 
 209 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (emphasizing that the UK 
should be responsible for creating its own laws and that the UK had to reassert its sovereignty); Vick-
ers, supra note 191, at 624–25 (noting that parties’ express choices of law can be put aside for reasons 
of public policy); Voser, supra note 68, at 327 (noting that the United States does not have mandatory 
rules, and instead U.S. courts will strike down parties’ choice if it violates a “fundamental policy of 
another state whose law would otherwise be . . . applicable”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 210 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (citing that one of the other 
fundamental goals of Brexit is to “take control of our own affairs” and to reestablish parliamentary 
sovereignty). 
 211 See European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (stating that Parlia-
ment has the ability to alter former EU law after the UK leaves the EU). 
 212 See The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, BERKELEY L. 3–4, https://www.law.berkeley.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AJD-2R6W] 
(reporting that common law originated in England in the Middle Ages and that William Blackstone’s 
treatise, Commentaries on the Laws of England, written in the eighteenth century, was the first treatise 
summarizing English common law); see also DEPARTMENT FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 
9417, at 9 (stressing that one of the goals of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”).  
 213 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9. 
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1980.214 Even though the Rome Convention was partially repealed, the UK 
issued a draft statutory instrument detailing the changes that would occur in 
order to convert the Rome Convention into UK domestic law, indicating that 
the Rome Convention still has operative force.215 This approach would retain 
the historical principles, such as party autonomy, because these principles ex-
isted before Rome I.216 Due to the fact that the Rome Convention was a treaty, 
the UK had the ability to enter a reservation to provisions that they disagreed 
with or did not wish to adopt.217 Therefore, provisions that were implemented 
through Rome I, such as mandatory overriding provisions, would be eliminated 
and only the Rome Convention provisions that the UK agreed to would exist.218 
The benefit of this approach is that it would reinforce parliamentary sov-
ereignty because only the provisions that the UK chose to agree to, and not 
enter a reservation to, would be part of UK law.219 Additionally, because the 
Rome Convention has never technically been repealed and has been operative 
in the UK since 1991, the amount of uncertainty caused by returning to this 
code would be reduced because there is a legislative and judicial history to 
look back on.220 The UK would be returning to a code that still exists and a 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990, c. 36, § 1, Sch. 1 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/1990/36/pdfs/ukpga_19900036_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC2D-HAPF] (detailing that 
the Rome Convention was incorporated into Schedule 1 of Contracts (Applicable Law) Act); Rühl, 
supra note 154, at 107–08 (hypothesizing that, regarding contracts, the UK will return to the Rome 
Convention because the Rome Convention never ceased to be in effect and that if Rome I is not re-
tained, then the Rome Convention will be transformed into “UK national law”). 
 215 See Exiting the European Union Private International Law, supra note 133, at art. 3; Rühl, 
supra note 154, at 108 (“[T]he Rome Convention was (partially) terminated under public international 
law. However, the UK belongs to those countries where application of international treaties requires 
implementation by national legislature . . . . [Therefore,] [i]f the Rome I Regulation ceases to apply as 
a result of Brexit, the Rome Convention will . . .  revive and become applicable before UK courts as a 
matter of UK national law.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 216 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 3, opened for signature 
June 19, 1980, 1980 O.J. (C 27) 37 (recognizing the principle of party autonomy). 
 217 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 163, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 331–33, 338 
(stating the Vienna Convention on Treaties, ratified in 1969, governs all treaties and allows for reser-
vations in which a country alters or does not adopt a provision); see Rome I Website, supra note 13 
(detailing that the UK entered a reservation to Article 7(1) which was the provision that allowed for 
overriding mandatory provisions). 
 218 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 163, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 332–33, 338 
(stating that the Vienna Convention on treaties, signed by the UK, allows for reservations meaning 
that a county can alter or choose not to adopt a provision). 
 219 See id.; Rome I Website, supra note 13 (detailing that the UK entered a reservation to Article 
7(1) which was the provision that allowed for overriding mandatory provisions). 
 220 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9 (citing that “providing legal 
certainty” is an important goal of Brexit); Rühl, supra note 154, at 108 (clarifying that the Rome Con-
vention has not technically been repealed). 
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treaty that some scholars argue should apply, at least in relation to EU Member 
States, regardless if the UK adopts alternative choice of law language.221 
The downside to this approach is that it would eliminate provisions that 
were once seen as positive changes by the UK government.222 For example, 
Article 9, defining the rule for mandatory overriding provisions, was seen as 
an improvement because it eliminated ambiguity in the Rome Convention.223 
The UK would have to decide whether giving up a perceived improvement and 
legal certainty is worth distancing itself from the EU regulation.224 
The other option would be to scrap both the Rome Convention and Rome 
I and return to following English common law.225 The benefit of this approach 
would be that the UK would only be following laws created by UK courts, 
which would reinforce parliamentary sovereignty.226 It would nonetheless be 
difficult to determine what the common law would be.227 For example, it is 
generally the trend in common law that some form of party autonomy will be 
recognized.228 Nevertheless, it is not immediately apparent which common law 
case details this principle or if that autonomy extends to implied choice.229 
There is even less certainty surrounding provisions such as overriding manda-
                                                                                                                           
 221 See Rühl, supra note 154, at 109 (citing that some scholars have looked at Denmark and con-
cluded that, as it pertains to other EU countries, it is possible that the Rome Convention, and not 
Rome I, should apply based on Article 25 of Rome I, but that the majority of scholars think that Rome 
I, rather than the Rome Convention, should apply based on Article 24); see also Council Regulation 
(EC) 593/2008, at 6, 15 (stating in Article 25 that “[t]his Regulation shall not prejudice the application 
of international conventions to which one or more Member States are parties at the time when this 
Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict-of-law rules relating to contractual obligations” 
and in Article 24 that “[t]his Regulation shall replace the Rome Convention in the Member States”). 
 222 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3–8 (stating generally that the modifications in 
Rome I were “improvements”). 
 223 See id. at 6 (“Article 9(3) . . . is unlikely to introduce any significant additional uncertainty 
into the law.”). 
 224 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (citing that “providing 
legal certainty” is an important goal of Brexit and that if possible the laws will be the same after Brex-
it and that one of the main goals of Brexit is parliamentary sovereignty). 
 225 See Beijing Jianlong Heavy Indus. Grp. v. Golden Ocean Grp. Ltd., Golden Zheijiang Inc., 
Ship Fin. Int’l Ltd. and SFL Bulk Holding Ltd. [2013] EWHC (Comm) 1063 [18]–[19] (Eng.) (citing 
to the cases of Ralli Bros v. Cia Naviera Sota y Aznar [1920] 2 KB 287 and Foster v. Driscoll [1929] 
1 KB 470 as examples of English case law regarding overriding mandatory provisions); see also The 
Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, supra note 212 (noting that the English common law has 
existed since the Middle Ages). 
 226 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 13 (stating that one of the fun-
damental goals of Brexit is to “take control of our own affairs” and to reestablish parliamentary sover-
eign because “it has not always felt like that”). 
 227 See infra notes 228–236 and accompanying text. 
 228 Practical Law Dispute Resolution, Governing Law and Jurisdiction Clauses, THOMSON REU-
TERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/I8abcb55e1c9a11e38578f7ccc
38dcbee/View/FullText.html [https://perma.cc/7QGC-KGD5] (reporting that courts will generally 
utilize and respect the parties’ choice of law). 
 229 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3 (stating that Rome I clarified that the choice of 
law can be inferred from the contract). 
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tory provisions because there is no general understanding that this principle 
should be upheld as common law.230 Instead, the UK will have to cobble to-
gether different cases to see how much is supported by existing law and how 
much was innovated by Rome I.231 The Ministry of Justice started on this anal-
ysis in regards to Article 9, determining that there is currently no clear authori-
ty detailing if English courts should respect the overriding mandatory provi-
sions of a foreign country.232 In this situation, the English government would 
have to decide either through subsequent cases or legislation whether provi-
sions like overriding mandatory provisions should extend to foreign nations 
rather than just the UK.233 
Further complicating the matter is the fact that one legal system does not 
govern the entirety of the UK, instead, there are three: English (governing 
England and Wales), Northern Irish, and Scottish.234 This would lead to a lot of 
uncertainty, as the three different systems would have to either agree to one set 
of cases to follow or risk having different laws in different parts of the UK.235 
This will likely increase the cost of doing business as it would make it more 
difficult for companies to evaluate the risk of doing business in the UK, due to 
uncertainty about which law applies.236 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See id. at 6 (stating that English common law has not addressed what to do about mandatory 
provisions if the law governing the contract is not English). 
 231 See id. at 6–7 (stating that “Article 9(3) generally reflects the English law position” when it 
comes to a “contract governed by English law, could be unenforceable in accordance with the English 
law” but there is “no conclusive English authority as to the situation where the law applicable to the 
contract is not English law,” although there is some authority that enforcing a contract that would 
breach foreign law would be “contrary to English public policy” under Foster, [1929] 1 KB 470). 
 232 See id. (stating that there is some authority, in Foster, for not enforcing contracts whose per-
formance would breach foreign law under the principle of comity). 
 233 See id. (defining the scope of Article 9(3) as focusing on the “discretionary application of 
certain rules of the country where a contract is to be, or has been, performed and which renders con-
tractual performance unlawful”); Suzanne Rab, Legal Systems in UK (England and Wales): Overview, 
THOMAS REUTERS PRAC. L., https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-636-2498 [https://perma.
cc/5DTS-QS3Q] (stating that the UK law is primarily promulgated by Acts of Parliament and the 
judicial branch). 
 234 See Bolam, supra note 13 (explaining that the UK, Scotland, and Northern Ireland all have 
their own laws and the courts “operate separately from the courts of England,” except that the “deci-
sions of the Court of Session, the highest court in Scotland, are subject to appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom in London”). 
 235 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9 (stressing that one of the goals 
of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”); Bolam, supra note 13 (explaining that in the UK, the Scot-
tish, Northern Irish, and English legal systems are all “separate and distinct”). 
 236 See Calleros, supra note 139, at 643 (certainty allows parties to “draft around [default rules] 
by framing their obligations or by choosing a different domestic governing law, or at least . . . assess 
their risks if they allow the default rules to apply”); see also HER MAJESTY’S GOV’T, supra note 11, at 
3 (emphasizing that the current relationship with the EU provides “predictability and certainty” which 
helps to avoid extra costs). 
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E. Proposed Solution: Weigh Keeping Each Provision  
Against if It Undermines UK Law 
The final option, and the one supported by this Note, is rather than just 
keeping the Rome I language automatically, a weighing test should be applied 
to each provision.237 The test would balance the UK’s two major goals regard-
ing any changes made to the legal system: providing certainty and reinforcing 
parliamentary sovereignty.238 
Performing a weighing test ensures that the goals of Brexit are being up-
held.239 Even if Parliament ends up choosing not to change any laws, this op-
tion would still meet the goal of reestablishing parliamentary sovereignty by 
demonstrating that Parliament considered each part of the regulation inde-
pendently for the purpose of enacting only those parts they felt advanced the 
interests of the UK.240 The downside is that it will take time to review each 
provision and it is unclear if Parliament would be willing to take the time to 
perform such review.241 Although this process would be similar to the process 
the UK went through when it chose to enter a reservation to the Rome Conven-
tion, subjecting each provision to the weighing test is nevertheless a large pro-
ject for Parliament to undertake.242 The Ministry of Justice, however, has al-
                                                                                                                           
 237 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (citing that “providing 
legal certainty” is an important goal of Brexit and that “wherever practical and appropriate, the same 
rules and laws will apply on the day after we leave the EU as they did before” and contrasting the 
desire to maintain consistency in the laws with the UK’s desire to reassert parliamentary sovereignty). 
 238 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, c. 16, § 7(2) (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/2018/16/pdfs/ukpga_20180016_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/VGG8-B74U] (reserving the right of 
Parliament to change the new rules on an ad hoc basis); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Cm. 9417, at 9, 13, 15 (stating that one of the goals is to “provid[e] certainty and clarity” in recogni-
tion of “how important it is to provide business, the public sector and the public with as much certain-
ty as possible” and another goal is “[t]aking control of our own laws” because “[t]he sovereignty of 
Parliament is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution” but also recognizing that any agree-
ments regarding dispute resolution must also “maximize legal certainty, including for businesses, 
consumers, workers and other citizens”). 
 239 DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 7–8 (citing that three of the twelve 
goals of Brexit are to give those in the UK legal certainty, to reassert parliamentary sovereignty by 
ensuring that laws affecting the UK are made in the UK, and “delivering a smooth, orderly exit from 
the EU”). 
 240 See id. at 13 (stressing the importance of reasserting parliamentary sovereignty). 
 241 See id. at 10 (summarizing the purpose of the Great Repeal Bill as “preserv[ing] EU law where 
it stands at the moment . . . Parliament (and, where appropriate, the devolved legislatures) will then be 
able to decide which elements of that law to keep, amend, or repeal once we have left the EU”); Letter 
from Theresa May, supra note 110 (stating that the UK government intends to focus on “the biggest 
challenges” first before focusing on more specialized areas); Hunt & Wheeler, supra note 1 (address-
ing that given that there is no deal currently in place, there are critical questions that the UK must 
address, but noticeably absent is mention of choice of law questions). 
 242 See Letter from Theresa May, supra note 110 (noting that the UK government should “priori-
tise the biggest challenges”). 
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ready provided a broad summary of the changes and, although it is not exhaus-
tive, it serves as a good starting point to identify the major changes.243 
The weighing test may help to preserve some legal certainty because it is 
likely that relatively few—if any—provisions will be changed.244 The only 
way the provisions could change is if the provision failed the test and the bene-
fit of repealing or modifying the rule to reinforce parliamentary sovereignty 
outweighs the uncertainty that would be caused by such a change.245 Evaluat-
ing different circumstances, including what would happen with Article 3 and 
Article 9, helps to demonstrate what this would look like in practice.246 
A provision could fail the weighing test if the rule is one that the UK sub-
stantively disagrees with or was hurting UK citizens or businesses.247 In such 
instances, the benefits of changing the rule would outweigh the uncertainty.248 
Historical provisions, such as Article 3, fall on the other end of the spectrum in 
that they “pass” the weighing test with relative ease. The principle of party 
autonomy has existed since the sixteenth century and is recognized by English 
common law.249 The changes made by Rome I were largely stylistic in nature, 
although it implemented a few substantive changes, and sought to eliminate 
ambiguity.250 Here, the benefits of modifying or eliminating these provisions do 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56 (“The purpose of this guidance is to provide a brief 
summary of the most important provisions in the Regulation . . . . This outline is not comprehensive in 
nature.”). 
 244 See id. at 3–8 (summarizing that generally the changes made in Rome I were “improvements” 
from the Rome Convention and helped to give the UK “legal certainty”). 
 245 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (citing that “providing 
legal certainty” is an important goal of Brexit and that if possible, the “same rules and laws will apply 
on the day after [the UK] leave[s] the EU as they did before” but that the government is also seeking 
to reassert parliamentary sovereignty and ensure that laws affecting the rights of UK citizens are being 
made in the UK). 
 246 See infra notes 248–265 and accompanying text. 
 247 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13, 15 (citing that some of the 
government’s goals in Brexit are to give certainty to businesses and to reassert parliamentary sover-
eignty and that any “arrangements must be ones that respect UK sovereignty, protect the role of our 
courts and maximize legal certainty, including for businesses, consumers, workers and other citi-
zens”). 
 248 See id. at 15 (citing that one of the major goals of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”). 
 249 See Zhang, supra note 14, at 516 (citing that the principle of party autonomy traces back to 
Charles Dumoulin, from the sixteenth century); see also COURTS AND TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, THE 
STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW AND THE UK JURISDICTION, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/08/legaluk-strength-of-english-law-draft-4-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJW9-5UYN] 
(reassuring parties that under English common law, their choice regarding which law governs their 
contracts will be respected). 
 250 Exiting the European Union Private International Law, supra note 133 at art. 10 (demonstrat-
ing that the changes to Rome I to convert it into domestic law are largely stylistic in nature). For ex-
ample, it details changes such as replacing “Member States” with “relevant states” in Article 3(4), the 
authority for this provision came from “the powers conferred by section 8(1) of, and paragraph 21(b) 
of Schedule 7 to, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018(a).” Id.; see also Rome I and Rome II 
Website, supra note 55 (stating that the practical effect of Rome I was similar to the Rome Conven-
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not outweigh the uncertainty caused by changing it because all Rome I did was 
alter the wording while maintaining the same practical effect.251 Overturning or 
changing these longstanding principles would only disrupt the system.252 There-
fore, historical provisions such as Article 3 should be maintained post-Brexit.253 
The more difficult cases are provisions, such as Article 9, which were im-
plemented into UK law through Rome I and do not mirror the Rome Conven-
tion or past precedent.254 Article 9 extended the principle of overriding manda-
tory provisions in a way that was not based in English precedent and was also 
a provision that the UK had previously entered a reservation to.255 
One way to analyze the test would be to point to the reservation of Article 
7(1) in the Rome Convention and say that the UK’s sovereignty was under-
mined when it was forced to enact a provision under the EU regulation that it 
had previously objected to and, therefore, that provision should be eliminat-
ed.256 Although this may appear to be a strong reason to eliminate a principle, 
this argument ignores the reason that the UK entered its reservation in the first 
place.257 The reservation was entered simply because Article 7(1) contained an 
unacceptable amount of ambiguity, not because the UK fundamentally disa-
greed with extending the doctrine of overriding mandatory provisions to third 
countries.258 In fact, the Ministry of Justice declared Article 9 to be a clearer 
iteration of Article 7(1).259 Article 9 actually produced certainty and although it 
                                                                                                                           
tion, however, it did make “some substantive changes [to the provisions], such as Article 9.3” but that 
“Rome I [sought] to enhance certainty . . . by converting mere presumptions into fixed rules”). 
 251 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 3 (“The effect of Article 3 of the Regulation 
should result in there being very little difference to that of the Rome Convention.”). 
 252 See Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 O.J. (C 27) at 37 
(recognizing the principle of party autonomy); see also DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Cm. 9417, at 9 (stressing that one of the goals of Brexit is to “provid[e] legal certainty”); Zhang, su-
pra note 14, at 516 (noting that the principle of party autonomy traces back to the sixteenth century). 
 253 See supra notes 249–252 and accompanying text. 
 254 See Rome I Website, supra note 13 (explaining that the Rome Convention contained a provi-
sion in Article 7(1) regarding overriding mandatory provisions but that the UK did not incorporate it 
into law and entered a reservation); see also MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6 (citing to Fos-
ter v. Driscoll as generally supporting the extension of overriding mandatory provision but also noting 
that Article 9(3) provided the answer to what to do with the overriding mandatory provisions of for-
eign countries where there was “no such clarity under English law”). 
 255 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6 (“There is no conclusive English authority as to 
the situation where the law applicable to the contract is not English law.”); Rome I Website, supra 
note 13 (explaining that the Rome Convention contained a provision in Article 7(1) regarding overrid-
ing mandatory provisions, but that the UK did not incorporate it into law and entered a reservation). 
 256 See Rome I Website, supra note 13 (detailing that the UK entered a reservation to Article 7(1) 
in the Rome Convention). 
 257 See id. (stating that the reservation to Article 7(1) “was not given effect . . . by the UK . . . on 
the grounds of uncertainty”). 
 258 See id. 
 259 See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 6–7 (stating that “Article 9(3) is formulated in 
terms that are sufficiently broad to cover situations of unlawful contractual performance where the 
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extended beyond English common law, it generally reflected the English 
Court’s position at the time.260 Therefore, the provision should pass the weigh-
ing test because there is not enough evidence of this provision “undermining 
sovereignty” to assert that it should be eliminated.261 Unless, UK businesses 
and citizens provided Parliament with an explanation of why this provision 
was harming them and should be changed.262 
Although the weighing test might not determine that all the Rome I provi-
sions should be kept, it appropriately balances the dual goals of Brexit articu-
lated by Parliament shortly after the vote.263 It would meet the goal of reassert-
ing parliamentary sovereignty because Parliament will have taken an active 
role in deciding which provisions to keep and considered those provisions in 
light of what is the best for the UK and its businesses.264 Equally as important, 
the weighing test advocates for a comprehensive review of each provision that 
would be published before any legal changes take effect and therefore would 
provide a clear map for businesses to follow and give them legal certainty.265 
CONCLUSION 
The UK is facing down a long and complicated process in attempting to 
untangle itself from the EU. The reasons for wanting to leave the EU are com-
                                                                                                                           
applicable law is foreign” and “removes the current ambiguity” and “constitutes an improvement in 
terms of legal certainty”). 
 260 See id. (stating that although there is “no conclusive English authority as to the situation where 
the law applicable to the contract is not English law” that “Article 9(3) generally reflects the English 
law position,” and “constitutes an improvement in terms of legal certainty”). 
 261 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 5 (citing that two of the main 
goals of Brexit are to “provid[e] certainty and clarity” and reassert sovereignty). 
 262 See Notice and Comment, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/rulemaking-
writing-agency-regulations/notice-and-comment/ [https://perma.cc/4DY7-GG8S] (describing the notice 
and comment process, including the ability for the public to “submit ‘written data, views, or arguments’ 
regarding a proposed rule”). The process proposed here is one that is similar to the notice and com-
ment procedure utilized by administrative agencies in the United States. See id. 
 263 See DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 9, 13 (emphasizing that one of 
the main goals of Brexit is parliamentary sovereignty, thus the UK should promulgate its own laws, 
not the EU, and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the court that enforces 
EU law, should be ended because, as shown by the introduction of “1,056 EU-related documents” to 
Parliament in 2016 alone, Parliament’s sovereignty has been undermined, but also stressing that legal 
certainty is important to the smooth functioning of businesses). 
 264 See id. at 9, 15 (noting that any “dispute resolution mechanisms” that are adopted must take 
into account parliamentary sovereignty and if the arrangement will “provid[e] legal certainty” to busi-
nesses and UK citizens). 
 265 See THE EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, SCRUTINISING BREXIT: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, 
2016-1, HL 33, at 4 (UK) (stating that “effective parliamentary scrutiny will help to ensure that there 
is an ‘audit trail’ for future generations”); DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Cm. 9417, at 
9–10 (wanting to provide certainty and to “allow[] businesses to continue trading in the knowledge 
that the rules will not change significantly overnight” and to understand the “key issues for business 
. . . ahead of the negotiations”). 
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plex and it has been made ever present that even those that voted to leave can-
not agree on a way forward. Nevertheless, this hurdle does not excuse the gov-
ernment from just adopting the rules that are easiest without giving thought to 
their implementation. If the UK is going to undertake this hurdle it should do 
so thoughtfully, weighing the effects of it modifications against its goals of 
certainty and sovereignty and providing detailed conclusions as a way to direct 
businesses and help the courts in interpreting the retained language. Otherwise, 
the relic of Rome I will be thrust on the courts to deal with and create uncer-
tainty and chaos in its wake. 
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